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                                                   Abstract 
                     Comparing Hitler and Stalin: Certain Cultural Considerations 
                                           by Phillip W. Weiss 
 
Adviser: Professor David M. Gordon 
 
There is a great temptation to compare the Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. 
This is true for two reasons: first, the careers of both men converged at the same 
point in history, thus doubling the impact both made and second, because the 
names Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin have become metaphors for ideologies and 
crimes that today are reviled. The question then arises: who was worse, Hitler or 
Stalin? This project shows that there is no viable, credible, definitive, or final 
answer to this question, and that prevailing attitudes about Hitler and Stalin have 
become so ingrained in contemporary society as to render any meaningful or 
useful comparison virtually impossible. Tragically, it might even be impossible to 
render a final totally objective judgment of their actions. This is the most 
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                                               Introduction 
Historian Richard Overy has written, “The temptation to compare Hitler and 
Stalin is a compelling one. They are popularly regarded as the twin demons of the 
twentieth century, responsible for different reasons and in different ways for 
more violent deaths than any other men in history” (Overy, 2004, xxxi). Overy is 
correct on both counts. There is a great temptation to compare the two. This is 
true for two reasons: first, the careers of both men converged at the same point 
in history, thus doubling the impact both made and second, because the names 
Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin have become metaphors for ideologies and crimes 
that today are reviled. The question then arises: who was worse, Hitler or Stalin?  
It is my thesis that there is no viable, credible, definitive, or final answer to 
this question, and that prevailing attitudes about Hitler and Stalin have become 
so ingrained in contemporary society as to render any meaningful or useful 
comparison virtually impossible. Tragically, it might even be impossible to render 
a final totally objective judgment of their actions. This is the most disturbing 
element of this work.  
It is argued that each dictator must be judged solely on his own record, and 
that neither dictator nor the ideologies they represent can be defended or 
attacked based on the record of the other. To support my thesis, this paper will 
include analysis and discussion of the relationship between mass media and its 
influence on shaping public opinion, discussion of the areas where the careers of 
Hitler and Stalin converge and diverge, the cultural influences that shaped their 





comparative analysis. This is followed by a conclusion based on the evidence 
presented.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 Why do Americans believe, even decades after their deaths, that Hitler and 
Stalin were twin demons, or, in the words of psychologist Marina Stal, “merciless 
tyrants” (Stal, 2013, 8)? It is understandable why Hitler and Stalin would have 
generated so much hostility when they were alive. There was overwhelming and 
incontrovertible evidence that both were pursuing aggressive, expansionist, 
ideologically driven programs that were brutalizing people and ultimately posing 
a threat to the security of the United States. American opposition to Hitler was not 
driven by prejudice against Germans nor were Americans unreasonably biased 
against Stalin, whose domestic program and foreign policy, both pre- and post-
World War Two, e.g., the collectivization of agriculture, the great purge, the Non-
aggression pact, the invasion of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States, the 
emergence of the Iron Curtain, the North Korean invasion of the south, Soviet 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, the emergence of “Red” China, and the 1948 
Berlin blockade, provided a long list of reasons for concern (Allport, 1954, 8). 
That was decades ago. However, there is still deep hatred for Hitler and Stalin 
today. In a 2011 BBC documentary about Stalin, the narrator, Professor David 
Reynolds, calls him a “gangster” and “street thug” (SMS, video). Reynolds’ 
contempt for the Soviet dictator is obvious, but the intensity of his hatred seems 
misplaced, for its target is dead and buried in Moscow. But for Reynolds, it was 
as though he was still alive. 
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Nevertheless, regardless of how detested they are, for a time both Hitler 
and Stalin were respected, their careers celebrated, their respective personas 
admired. Hitler was admired by much of the British establishment, including 
Lloyd George. The US ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph Davies, wrote a 
book, Mission to Moscow, which extolled the virtues of the country under Stalin. 
After World War Two the Supreme Allied Commander and future president of the 
United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a gesture of mutual respect, joined Stalin 
on the podium in Red Square to celebrate victory (GtS, video, n.d.). Rochus Misch, 
Hitler’s bodyguard and valet, who lived with Hitler for five years, knew Hitler “only 
as a wonderfully good boss” and said that “we couldn’t have wished for better” 
and that “he was never authoritarian” (Lock, 9/6/13). The 1935 documentary 
Triumph of the Will contains scenes showing hundreds of thousands of Germans 
wildly cheering Hitler.  
The reason why Hitler and Stalin, even decades after their deaths, still 
provoke such strong negative feelings is because their names have been kept 
alive by the mass media, which is responsible for shaping what the public knows, 
believes and remembers. Social psychologist Edward Bernays wrote:  
We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes 
formed, our ideas suggested largely by men we have 
never heard of. This is the logical result of the way our 
democratic society is organized. (Bernays, 2005, 37) 
 
Our thoughts and perceptions are based on information and knowledge that we 
are taught. Professor Reynolds is part of that process. By devoting a full-length  
documentary to Stalin, he was helping to keep the memory of both Hitler and 
Stalin alive. 
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Now, what is meant by the term “mass media”? The mass media are those 
organizations through which information is disseminated to the public. They 
include newspapers, books, magazines, radio, television, and the movies. Print 
media has existed for centuries and for centuries was the dominant method for 
the dissemination of information. However, print has been eclipsed by movies 
and television, and today these instruments are dominant.  
The appeal of movies is without rival. First, they are readily accessible in 
theaters, homes, online and on DVDs, and second, can be enjoyed by anyone: 
one does not have to be literate, educated or specially trained. Movies can be 
watched in small groups or in large audiences. Because movies can be watched, 
they are often a social event. Movies and its first cousin television are without a 
doubt the most democratic and most efficient form of mass communication in 
history. Their pervasiveness and place in contemporary culture is so well 
established and so self-evident that it requires no further comment here. It is 
extremely unlikely that by the age of three a person has not been repeatedly 
exposed to movies or television. 
Movies have a worldwide appeal. This is because they are packaged as art, 
that is, something that is created specifically to influence the emotions. Movies 
tantalize us. Reading a book forces the reader to use their imagination; watching 
a movie allows the passive absorption of what is imagined (by others) seem real. 
Some of the most honored artists in the world today are film producers, directors  
and actors. Many, including some who have been dead for decades – Gable, 
Chaplin, Monroe, Bogart, Hepburn, Brando, Dean, Presley, Harlow, Scorcese,  
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Coppola, Eastwood, Redford – are household names, or at least are widely known. 
Playwrights have become screen writers (e.g., Harold Pinter); artists art directors 
(e.g., Boris Levin); photographers cinematographers (e,g, James Wong Howe), 
and stage actors movie stars (e.g., Gregory Peck and Marlon Brando).  
Through movies and television shows, cleverly crafted in ways meant to 
attract, engage and keep an audience’s attention, the public is bombarded with 
stories and images, produced by others who continuously shape our 
understanding and perception of history and reality. Mass communications 
expert Matthew McCombs writes: 
Over time the issues emphasized in news reports 
become the issues regarded as most important among 
the public. The agenda of the news media becomes, to a 
considerable degree, the agenda of the public. In other 
words, the news media sets the public agenda. 
(McCombs, 2004, 2) 
 
This is even more true in the case of movies, and of television in general, 
because these influence the way we form our opinions on a whole range of 
subjects including Nazism, Hitler, Stalin, Communism and the Soviet Union. That 
the mere mention of the names of Hitler or Stalin still generates passionate 
controversy today is evidence of this conditioning process. Both men and their 
respective regimes are dead and gone yet their names and legacies linger on 
among a public increasingly ignorant of most things. That they are the subject of 
discussion in this paper is only further evidence of that conditioning. 
Let us explore the relationship between the media and social conditioning 
further.  By 1960 in the United States movies were being shown in some 18,000 
locations throughout the nation (Neale, 323, 2012). Although attendance figures  
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vary, there is no question that movies were seen by millions of people per week. 
(The House Committee on Un-American Activities reported that in 1947 the figure 
was over 85,000,000 (HCUA, 1947, 1)). Other estimates are 90 million in 1946 to 46 
million in 1953, to 44 million in 1965 (Neale, 328, n. 16, 2012).  
 As the figures cited above indicate, during the twenty years after the end of 
World War Two, attendance in movie theaters substantially declined.  However, 
that in no way meant that movies were losing their popularity. In fact quite the 
contrary. The same period experienced the emergence of television which, by 
1960, had become the “hot new medium,” with 90 percent of American homes 
equipped with sets (Wasko, 380, 2012). This furnished the movie industry a new 
outlet for distributing its movies and further extending its reach. Hollywood 
adopted various strategies for co-existing and exploiting television. By 1952, 
television subsidiaries were formed by Columbia (Screen Gems), Universal 
(United World Features), and Monogram (Interstate Television); by 1964, six 
Hollywood companies represented 45 percent of the domestic market for  
syndicated TV series (Wasko, 378, 3012). Hollywood also began broadcasting 
major feature films on television. Feature films provided up to 48 percent of the 
programing for independent stations, and by the mid-1960s television was heavily 
dependent on Hollywood-produced programming. Finally, studios diversified 
through the purchase of television networks (Wasko, 379 f, 2012). The Hollywood  
studio executive credited for recognizing the potential of television as an 
instrument for promoting and distributing movies was Walt Disney. Disney 
explained, “Through television I can reach my audience. I can talk to my audience.  
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They are the audience that want to see my pictures” (Wasko, 381, 2012). 
Television thus proved to be a boom for the industry which was now virtually 
guaranteed instant access into almost every household in the United States. 
Movie studios also create the audiences to whom they want to sell (Denby, 
10, 2012). They can neither afford to wait for cues as to what the public wants nor 
can they engage in guesswork about prevailing popular trends. They have to 
create the market. This is achieved by prepping their audience through 
advertising and then producing a product that the audience will want to watch. If 
this succeeds, as it often does, it has such a profound effect as to even introduce 
new words and catch-phrases that become part of everyday language. Examples 
of the latter are “Go ahead, make my day” from the 1974 movie Sudden Impact 
and “Show me the money!” from the 1996 movie Jerry Maguire. Thus movies 
shape our language and through it what we think. The image of a tall, menacing-
looking white police detective in Sudden Impact pointing a cocked and fully 
loaded .347 Magnum handgun at the head of a terrified black man and coldly 
uttering the words “Go ahead, make my day,” conveys an unmistakable set of 
messages pertaining to the police, the nature of crime, the treatment of 
lawbreakers, the law, and race. 
Now, what happens inside the minds of the audience as they are watching 
a movie? It is that the images being displayed on the screen become transformed  
into something that the audience believes to be real or treats as real. What we see 
on the screen we believe to be true, even if we cognitively understand it to be 
fiction. Social philosopher Dominic M. McIver Lopes writes:  
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There is no intrinsic or phenomenological difference 
between experiences as of actual objects and events in 
movies and experiences as of fictional ones. The 
content of cinematic experience, we may say, draws no 
ontological distinctions. Indeed, this is part of what 
makes film fictions so convincing – and potentially so 
dangerous (McIver Lopes, 1997, 345) 
 
McIver Lopes’ findings are only partially disputed by film historian Richard Allen 
who writes: 
Contemporary film theorists construe the film spectator 
as a passive observer of the image who is duped into 
believing that it is real. In fact, as I shall argue, the film 
spectator knows it is only a film and actively participates 
in the experience of illusion that the cinema affords. 
(Allen, 1995, 3) 
 
It is the active participation alluded to by Allen that engages the spectator and 
blurs the line between reality and fiction, and which, in the words of Soviet film 
maker Dziga Vertov, helps the audience see the world from a fresh perspective 
(Petric, 2012, 112). For instance, the 1956 movie The Ten Commandments depicts 
a handsome, virile and heroic Moses decisively defeating his political rival and 
step-brother, the sinister and venal Ramses II, and leading his people out of the 
land of Egypt with the blessing of the Almighty. What we are seeing is fiction, and 
is recognized as such, yet while we are watching it we feel like it is true. The 
suggestive power of the imagery is irresistible. The scenes of a triumphant Moses, 
representing all that is good, and the vanquished Ramses, thoroughly humiliated 
and his army drowned, are imbedded in our psyche and incorporated into our  
view of the world. The political message, that freedom is ordained and that those 
who oppose it are doomed, is unmistakable. The timing of the movie’s release, 
during the height of the Cold War, is more than coincidental. (One might add that  
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at the time, and for a good deal afterwards, Communist regimes claimed a similar 
inevitability through Marxist dialectic, first proclaimed in the Communist 
Manifesto, of the triumph of Socialism.) Likewise, through a plethora of other 
movies the audience learns how a saloon is supposed to look in a Western, how 
extraterrestrials appear, and that a romance is doomed if one partner is staring 
straight-ahead in the direction of the camera (Schweinitz, xiv, 2011). Film 
historian Jorg Schweinitz writes: “The audience has learned all this not through 
experience in their everyday lives outside the media (insofar as such an existence 
is possible) but over the course of many years of spectatorship in the intertextual 
space of filmic imagination” (Schweinitz, xiv, 2011).  
Movies transmit streams of images reflecting the movie studio’s 
understanding of reality. This understanding shapes the message that the studio 
wants to convey, which is then transmitted to the audience in the form of 
stereotypes. Social psychologists Charles Stangor and Mark Schaller write: 
In modern society, the form by which most stereotypes 
are transmitted is through the mass media – literature,  
television, movies, newspapers …. (Stangor and Schaller, 
1996, 12) 
 
The term stereotype is another word for category; to stereotype is to categorize. 
Stereotyping allows us to compartmentalize our thinking, that is, to group things 
in categories, which helps to streamline our understanding of the world and 
determine what is true. This includes the way we perceive people, who we  









The human mind must think with the aid of categories 
(the term is equivalent here to generalizations). Once  
formed, categories are the basis for normal 
prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process. 
Orderly living depends on it. (Allport, 1979, 20). 
 
Stereotyping in turn affects the way we learn and what we learn. Stangor and 
Schaller write: 
As mental representations of the world, stereotypes 
influence what information is sought out, attended to, 
and remembered about members of social groups, as 
well as influencing social behavior (Stangor and 
Schaller, 1996, 6) 
 
Stereotyping is as natural as breathing, and as with breathing, as long as we live 
the tendency to stereotype never stops. 
Watching a movie involves two parties: the source – the creator of the 
movie, and the recipient – the spectator. The movie itself is a surrogate for the 
person who created it. Both the creator of the movie and the spectator perceive 
the world based on stereotypes. Schweinitz writes, “[S]tereotypes exist as mental 
constructs in the minds of individuals … including producers and recipients of 
texts” (Schweinitz, 2011, 39). In the process of watching a movie, the spectator is 
exposed to its stereotypical material, which is now doing the thinking for the 
spectator who is actively absorbing, and vicariously experiencing, all the sounds 
and images stereotypes being conveyed. Critical thinking plays no part in the 
process. For instance, in the movie Ben Hur the title character, Judah Ben Hur, a 
Jewish prince living under Roman occupation in Palestine, is portrayed as a 





identity is repeatedly emphasized. This evokes feelings of sympathy and empathy 
not only for the character but for the people he metaphorically symbolizes – Jews. 
Since Ben Hur is a victim, all Jews are now victims, which is the image of Jews  
that, for whatever reason, the studio wants to convey to the audience, which was 
in marked contradiction of much that came before it. From this moment forth this 
stereotype becomes reinforced. Such stereotypes become, in Schweinitz’s words, 
“cultural signs,” which in turn become incorporated into our mainstream culture 
and are henceforth construed as fact (Schweinitz, 2011, xiv).   
Movies alter our knowledge. Things that we see on the screen become 
incorporated in our personal information. This storage is an automatic process 
(Barsalou, 1992, 65). In a crime drama we think we learn something about the 
police and criminals; in a court room drama we learn something about the system 
of justice; in a war movie we think we learn something about war; in a romance 
we learn something about love; and in a movie about Hitler or Stalin we learn 
something about them. We vicariously experience what the characters are 
experiencing on the screen. That the source of the knowledge is a work of fiction 
is irrelevant; it is the experience of watching that counts. While watching the 
American soldiers storm Omaha Beach and fight the Nazis in The Longest Day, 
the audience is there too, absorbing the sights and sounds of the event and 
incorporating it in their memory for future reference. From that movie the 
audience learns that Americans are resilient, valiant and victorious, lessons that 





Movies also have a kind of archival effect. Film historian Marcus Stiglegger 
writes: 
The great success, as well as the influence, of TV 
programs and films such as Holocaust (1978) and 
Schindler’s List (1993) on public opinion about historical 
events – especially in Germany – strongly suggests that 
the worldwide audience is more open to fictionalized 
history than to more challenging essayistic work such as 
Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah (1985). (Stiglegger, 2012, 1). 
 
Stiglegger asks if cinema has reached the status of an historical archive for  
 
some audiences. The answer to that question is: it has.  
Today the movies are a modern historical archive. This is a function of a 
mental process called visual imagery which allows the human mind to retain 
imagined images after the actual perceived image is gone (Posner and Raichle, 
1994, 88). There are many major historical events, personages or eras in history 
for which information can be found in a full length motion picture, which are 
understood to be authoritative sources, even though they are works of fiction. It 
must also be remembered that history itself is subjective. The events of the past 
are open to interpretation. Hence, there is no one who can say with absolute 
certainty that, for instance, Oliver Stone’s production of Alexander (2004) is 
entirely historically inaccurate (although the temptation is very great) or that the 
portrayal of Lincoln in Abe Lincoln in Illinois (1940) is completely incorrect. And 
even if the facts are stretched for dramatic purposes, the audience still learns 
about these characters and the period of time in which they lived. The movie itself 





Why is an audience more receptive to fictionalized history, which in the 
strict sense of the word is not even history, then to the documentary format, 
which is nonfiction and presumably based in facts? The reason is because fiction  
appeals to the emotions. For instance, the movie Gone with the Wind is about the 
Civil War and the South in transition. The movie cleverly plays to a wide range of  
emotions – anger, loss, sorrow, redemption, love, hate, happiness, sadness – 
which transforms the story, and therefore the war, into something personal, 
meaningful and worth remembering. Although a work of fiction, the movie, which 
is still popular today, is now part of an imagined historical archive. That it 
embellishes facts and is entirely a work of fiction is secondary.  
Motion pictures as archival sources are organized in different categories, 
or genres, of film. There are biographies such as The Jolson Story (1946), war 
movies such as Thirty Seconds over Tokyo (1944), disaster movies such as 
Titanic (1997), and histories such as El Cid (1961). Often, movies cross into two or 
more genres. Thus a war movie may double as a biography, examples being The 
Gallant Hours (1960) and To Hell and Back (1955). Often, the same subject is 
treated in several movies. For instance, one can learn at least something about 
the origins of Christianity by watching Quo Vadis (1951), The Robe (1953), Ben 
Hur (1959), King of Kings (1961), The Greatest Story Ever Told (1965), The Last 
Temptation of Christ (1997), and The Passion of the Christ (2004). The 
combinations of movies containing information about topics of historical interest 
are almost endless. That these are commercial rather than academic products is 




sources of information. Regarding Thirty Seconds over Tokyo, a review of the 
movie in Variety on December 31, 1943, included this statement: “After Doolittle 
finally tells them of their mission to bomb Japan, the war becomes a highly  
personalized thing (italics added) through the actions of these crew members.” 
Through this movie the public learns about the war in the Pacific, why the US was  
fighting, the servicemen actually doing the fighting, and how the US intended to 
win. 
 In the late 1930s complaints were raised that Hollywood was producing in 
support of US involvement in the European war. Immediately prior to US entry, 
the American public had generally been in favor of providing material assistance 
to the British and in the form of Lend-Lease. However, there was little support for 
direct military involvement. At the time, Adolf Hitler was not universally 
considered a threat; in fact, in the United States he was admired by some. Even 
after Kristallnacht, in November 1938, when Nazi anti-Semitism erupted with a 
fury that shocked and disgusted much of the world, the United States maintained  
diplomatic relations (albeit on a lower level than previously)with the Nazi regime. 
American hero and US Army pilot Charles Lindbergh, who lived in England and 
France in the late 1930s and met with high-ranking military officials of Britain, 
France and Germany in 1938, was outspoken in opposing the US becoming 
involved in a European war. Not only did Lindbergh believe that the British and 
French were ill-prepared to fight, he also believed it would be a great mistake to 
fight Hitler. Lindbergh argued that Hitler’s destruction would “lay Europe open to 




wounding of Western civilization” (Lindbergh, 1978, 177). Other prominent 
organizations that opposed US entry into the war were the Communist Party (until 
June of 1941), the American Youth Congress, the Mothers’ Crusade, the  
Paul Revere Sentinels, the Women’s Neutrality League, and individuals such as 
journalist John T. Flynn and General Robert E. Wood of the America First  
Committee, socialist Norman Thomas, Father Charles Coughlin, and Senators 
Robert La Follette (R-Wisconsin), Gerald Nye (R-North Dakota), and Burton 
Wheeler (D-Montana) (Johnson, 1960, 174-175). 
However, despite considerable popular ambivalence over whether to enter 
the war, Hollywood produced several major feature films which seemed to 
advocate both an anti-Nazi and pro-war position. These movies include 
Confessions of a Nazi Spy (1939), Foreign Correspondent (1940), The Great 
Dictator (1940), The Mortal Storm (1940), Sergeant York (1941), A Yank in the RAF 
(1941), and Man Hunt (1941). Although ostensibly a comedy, the theme of The 
Great Dictator is unmistakable: that Hitler and Mussolini pose a threat to the 
peace of the world and must be stopped. (As well, of course, that they were 
vicious fools who could be stopped.) The Mortal Storm similarly makes no effort 
to disguise its anti-Nazi message. In response, a Senate subcommittee on 
Interstate Commerce was created to investigate “Motion Picture and Radio 
Propaganda.” Studio executives Harry Warner and Darryl F. Zanuck, and the 
studios’ attorney (and former Republican Presidential candidate) Wendell Willkie, 





intervention. The subcommittee’s proceedings were only abandoned when the 
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 (Neve, 2012, 389-390). 
 With the entry of the US in the war, the federal government and the motion 
picture industry joined forces to whip up public support for the war effort.  
President Roosevelt created the Office of War Information, which included the 
Bureau of Motion Pictures. In 1942 the BMP issued a Government Information  
Manual for the Motion Picture Industry. This manual detailed how Hollywood 
should fight the war. According to the manual, the war was “a fight for democracy 
and the ‘Four Freedoms’ against the forces and values of fascism” (Neve, 2012, 
390). By late 1942, Hollywood was making movies which stressed themes such as 
inclusiveness, self-sacrifice and cooperation. The movie studios were fully 
committed to winning the war. Warner Brothers took the lead in contributing to 
this propaganda. Many of the Warner Brothers movies are today considered 
classics. They include Yankee Doodle Dandy (1942), Casablanca (1943), Edge of 
Darkness (1943) and Watch on the Rhine (1943). These were made not just for 
entertainment, but to convey and promote a political message: that the US 
represents principles worth defending. The scenes in Yankee Doodle Dandy of 
James Cagney and the entire ensemble singing “I’m a Yankee Doodle Dandy” and 
“You’re a Grand Old Flag” accompanied by a bevy of American flags waving in 
the breeze convey an image of the United States as strong, united and rallying 
around the flag. Studio head Jack Warner explained that these movies were 
meant to help people “understand the peace and the victory” (Neve, 2012, 390). 




an American mass medium never equaled before or since by a government 
agency” (Neve, 2012, 391). From this partnership between government and 
Hollywood, one fact emerges – the role played by the American motion picture 
industry as a conduit for propaganda. 
 From December 7, 1941 until the end of the war in August 1945, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, united by their mutual opposition to Hitler, were  
allies. Despite this commonality of purpose, movie studios, in an effort to avoid 
being accused of being Communist or fronting for Communists, tended to shy 
away from movies that were overtly supportive of the Soviet regime. Nevertheless, 
during the war several major motion pictures were released which extolled the 
heroism and fortitude of the Russian people in their fight against German 
aggression while refraining from mentioning the Soviet system. Such movies 
include The North Star (1943), Three Russian Girls (1943), Why We Fight Part 5 - 
The Battle of Russia (1943), Days of Glory (1944), Song of Russia (1944), and 
Counter Attack (1945). Only one, Mission to Moscow (1943) was relentlessly pro-
Stalin, even supporting the purges. After the war, it, along with North Star and 
Song of Russia were used as evidence supporting charges that Hollywood was 
using movies to disseminate Communist propaganda (HCUA, 1947, 5-55).  
 At the same time the American film industry was producing works 
denigrating the Nazis and anything German. German characters were shown as 
sinister, cunning, untrustworthy, devious, arrogant, militaristic, boastful, nasty, 
and cowardly. They spoke English with heavy German accents. Nazism was 




Nazi theme can be found in many movies including the Walt Disney cartoons Der 
Fuehrer's Face (1943), Spirit of ’43 (1943), and Education for Death: The Making of 
the Nazi (1943) as well as in a number of full length films, some of which are 
today also considered classics. Those include Casablanca (1942), Commandos 
Strike at Dawn (1942), Desperate Journey (1942), Hitler – Dead or Alive (1942), The 
Devil with Hitler (1942), Paris Calling (1942), Edge of Darkness (1943), Hitler's  
Children (1943), Sahara (1943), The Cross of Lorraine (1943), Lifeboat (1944), 
None Shall Escape (1944), The Hitler Gang (1944), and Waterfront (1944).  
 While Hollywood was busy making movies to bolster public support for the 
war, the German film industry was also busy making propaganda movies.  
Some movies sought to emulate Hollywood musicals and comedies and were 
purely escapist fare, suggesting a Germany that was happy and carefree. Other 
movies contained anti-British themes. These movies include Titanic (1943), Ohm 
Kruger (Uncle Kruger) (1941) with Academy Award winner Emil Jannings,  
Carl Peters (1941) and Mein Leben fur Irland (My Life for Ireland) (1941). Movies 
with anti-Semitic themes include Jud Suss (The Jew Suss) (1940), Der ewige Jude 
(The Eternal Jew) (1940) and The Rothschilds (1940). The Rothschilds closes with 
a shot of a Jewish star superimposed over all of England. Stukas (1941) 
dramatizes the deeds of the dashing pilots of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force). 
The German motion picture industry also produced hundreds of weekly 
newsreels entitled Die Deutsche Wochenschau (the German Weekly News). These 
newsreels reported on the war. Each was about twenty minutes long and was 




graphic scenes of combat, destruction and death. Die Deutsche Wochenschau 
dated February 26, 1941 shows a somber and serious Adolf Hitler, accompanied 
by Hermann Goering and a large contingent of German senior military officers, at  
a public ceremony solemnly placing a wreath at the coffin of a soldier who had 
died “in service to the Reich”; Hitler is also shown paying his respects to a woman 
(perhaps the soldier’s mother). Die Deutsche Wochenschau dated July 9, 1941  
shows German soldiers invading the Soviet Union, destroying Soviet defenses, 
being welcomed as liberators, and rounding up Jews. Die Deutsche Wochenschau 
of July 21, 1941 shows graphic panoramic scenes of an entire city, purportedly 
Smolensk, completely gutted, allegedly by the retreating Bolsheviks, further 
evidence of Soviet wantonness. The newsreel for Christmas 1942 shows scenes of 
Germans soldiers at the front, from the Arctic to the deserts of North Africa, and 
German civilians at home, celebrating Christmas, including German children 
bringing presents to injured soldiers in a hospital. It also had scenes purporting to 
show captured American soldiers (“Americanischer gefangenen”) looking beaten, 
tired and dejected. Die Deutsche Wochenschau from June 14, 1944 shows German 
army and SS troops fighting the Allied armies in France, scenes of destroyed 
Allied tanks, aircraft, and other equipment, and Allied soldiers taken prisoner. The 
final newsreel in this series was produced in March 1945. 
 After the war, with the Nazi threat gone and the start of the Cold War and 
the division of Europe into Western and Soviet spheres, Hollywood turned its 
attention to the threat of international Communism and its chief proponent, the 




American Activities, whose members “saw the film industry as vulnerable to 
charges of communist subversion” (Neve, 2012, 391), Hollywood soon was  
producing an array of motion pictures with themes that were anti-Communist and 
anti-Soviet. These movies include The Iron Curtain (1948), The Red Menace (1949), 
I Married a Communist (1949), The Big Lift (1950), Invasion U.S.A. (1952), I Was a 
Communist for the FBI (1955), The Journey (1959), One-Two-Three (1961),  
The Manchurian Candidate (1962), From Russia with Love (1963), Doctor Zhivago 
(1966), The Deadly Affair (1966), Torn Curtain (1966), Ice Station Zebra (1968), 
Topaz (1969), The Spy Who Loved Me (1977), and Red Scorpion (1989).  
As with the anti-Nazi movies, these portray the Soviet Union and its agents 
in strictly stereotypical fashion. Either they are concocting nefarious plans to 
subvert the West, either through espionage or by direct military action, or 
behaving like martinets, thus inviting ridicule. The larger theme was that the 
Soviet Union and its allies are sinister, utterly unscrupulous and had to be 
checked. One-Two-Three includes scenes of a divided Berlin as a backdrop for a story 
that highlights Cold War tensions through comedy, thus sugaring the message. Doctor 
Zhivago depicts a Russia under the yoke of Bolshevik rule and includes the chilling lines, 
“The personal life is dead in Russia.” and “private life is dead for a man with any 
manhood.” Torn Curtain plays up the threat posed by Soviet espionage. Red Dawn 
depicts a United States under a brutal Soviet military occupation. The Manchurian 
Candidate includes graphic scenes of Soviet agents brainwashing an American Korean 
war veteran into becoming a political assassin inside the United States.  
While Hollywood was selling the anti-Bolshevik line to the American people, the 




the Russian people and Soviet society in a most positive, upbeat, and  optimistic light. 
These movies include Circus (1936), Volga-Volga (1938), Kotovsky (1942), The Stone  
Flower (1946), The Ballad of Siberia (1947) and The Cranes are Flying (1957). Volga-Volga, 
a comedy, is said to have been Joseph Stalin’s favorite movie (The Hype, online). When 
watching these movies, one would never know that Soviet Union was a massive police 
state.  
 Although Nazi Germany had been defeated and replaced by the Soviet Union as 
the arch-villain in movies, Nazism remained a favorite target for the American film 
industry. In 1960 Israel captured, kidnapped and tried accused German war criminal 
Adolf Eichmann, one of the key perpetrators of the Holocaust. This event marked the 
start of the second phase of Hollywood’s Nazi bashing. In this phase the stories are more 
complex and the characterizations of the Germans generally more subtle and substantive 
then those produced during the war. Nevertheless the underlying theme remains 
unchanged: that Nazism is a detestable aberration that was responsible for causing 
misery and death and that anyone who was a Nazi was emotionally defective, 
intellectually hapless, wantonly sadistic, and morally corrupt. Movies that touch 
on these themes include Judgment at Nuremberg (1961), The Longest Day (1962), 
The Great Escape (1963), The Pawnbroker (1964), The Sound of Music (1964), The 
Train (1964), Von Ryan’s Express (1965), Is Paris Burning? (1966) The Dirty Dozen 
(1968), The Damned (1969), Patton (1970), QB VII  (1974 TV miniseries), Seven 
Beauties (1975), The Boys From Brazil (1978), Holocaust (1978 TV miniseries), 
Das Boot (1981), Winds of War (1983 TV miniseries), Sophie’s Choice (1982), 
Schindler’s List (1993), Saving Private Ryan (1994), and The Reader (2008).  
Judgment at Nuremberg includes this line, “If there is to be any salvation for 




humiliation.” The Dirty Dozen depicts senior German army officers as wastrels 
and drunkards. QB VII deals with the theme of Nazi physicians as recalcitrant 
criminals. Das Boot, featuring an all-German cast, depicts German naval 
personnel as disillusioned; in one scene Hermann Goering is called a “fat slob.” 
Schindler’s List contains graphic scenes of German guards brutalizing and  
terrorizing Jews. The Reader depicts a female former concentration camp guard 
who is not only complicit in the burning deaths of hundreds of Jews, but is a 
functional illiterate and pedophile as well – perfect prerequisites for achieving 
gainful employment under the Nazis. Although indicted and convicted of war 
crimes, the character projects a certain pathos which brings out the woman’s 
essential banality and the corrupting effect of the system she served. 
Movies in which Hitler himself is a principal character include Hitler (1962), 
Hitler: The Last Ten Days (1973), The Death of Adolf Hitler (1973), The Bunker 
(1981), Downfall (Der Untergang) (2004), Hitler – The Rise of Evil (2003 TV series), 
Valkyrie (2008) and Inglorious Basterds (2009). In these movies Hitler is invariably 
portrayed as shrill, moody, short-tempered, easily distracted, and prone to verbal 
outbursts. For instance, Downfall contains (apparently accurate) scenes of a 
disheveled and wild-eyed Hitler ranting and wandering about the bunker as the 
Reich is in its final death throe. Hitler – The Rise of Evil depicts a young, scowling, 
pouting Hitler who abuses animals and screams his way to power. Inglorious 
Basterds includes depictions of a gloating, boastful and vain Hitler dressed in full 
Nazi regalia, which is pure caricature. Regarding Hitler’s behavior, Dr. Eduard 




well-mannered and neatly dress” (Bloch, 1943).  (This is not in any way to 
diminish the magnitude of his later crimes.) 
Omitted from this discussion are titles from the hundreds of documentaries 
that have been produced about Hitler or include Hitler, and the almost countless  
number of parodies of Hitler published on video-sharing websites. Based on the 
sheer volume of videos devoted to Hitler online, it is apparent that Adolf Hitler, 
although gone, is far from forgotten, his name and image kept alive in the myriad 
of movies and videos with a worldwide audience. It is the rare person indeed that 
has not heard of the name Adolf Hitler. 
 Hitler and the Nazi regime are so widely associated with the perpetration of 
war crimes that it may come as surprise to the reader that during World War Two 
the Wehrmacht commissioned a War Crimes Bureau staffed by military judges to 
systematically collect and analyze evidence of crimes committed by the Allies, 
including the United States and the Soviet Union. This evidence was to be used to 
prosecute Allied civilian and military personnel for allegedly violating 
international law. The Bureau investigated numerous complaints of alleged 
infractions and violations of the rules of war, and reported their findings to the 
German government, which, through diplomatic channels via so-called protecting 
powers (in which capacity the United States had served on behalf of the British 
prior to the US entry in the war) filed numerous official protests. To today’s 
reader, the idea of the regime led by Adolf Hitler alleging violations of 
international law by the Allies may seem the height of absurdity, but when these 




from settled, and so their allegations could not be discounted or dismissed as 
grumblings of a bad loser. Had the war ended differently, they might have been 
taken seriously in some neutral quarters. Further, these protests were being 
transmitted by official third-parties who bore witness to their contents and  
seriousness. The Nuremburg War Crimes trial had not yet occurred and Germans, 
including Adolf Hitler, had yet to be indicted for anything. Questions of culpability 
were still an open book.  
During the war, the German government also officially accused the Soviet 
Union of “having murdered and tortured Germans prisoners in bestial and 
indescribable fashion” (de Zayas, 1979, 88).1 German officers believed that the 
Red Army did not observe the laws of war. The International Committee of the 
Red Cross was refused permission to visit POW camps in the Soviet Union (de 
Zayas, 1979, 95). After the US entered the war, Germany gave no indication that it 
would try US and British POWs for war crimes. However, that policy changed 
after December 16, 1943, when the Soviet Union initiated the first war crimes trial 
against three captured German soldiers accused of having murdered Soviet 
citizens in gas vans. The German soldiers were convicted and executed on 
December 19, 1943. The proceedings were attended by numerous British and 
American journalists (de Zayas, 1979, 99). Eighty German POWs were also 
executed by Free French Forces on September 2, 1944 (de Zayas, 1979, 152).  
 
                                                          
1 De Zayas’ book, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, is controversial and the allegations it contains have not 
been independently corroborated by any court of law nor were any Allied governments or Allied military forces 
discussed in the book ever formally accused or convicted of war crimes. Further, the Nazi regime bears full 





A German report alleged the mutilation of corpses and the maltreatment of 
soldiers by civilians on Crete (de Zayas, 1979, 157). German investigators  
determined that on July 1, 1941 in the Ukraine Russians soldiers had massacred 
153 captured German soldiers (de Zayas, 1979, 163). Regarding allegations of 
mistreatment of German POWs by the Russians during the war, de Zayas writes: 
From 1941 to 1945 the Bureau compiled several 
thousand depositions, reports, and captured papers 
which, if nothing else, indicate that the killing of German 
prisoners of war upon capture or shortly after 
interrogation was not an isolated occurrence. (de Zayas, 
1979, 164) 
 
The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau also investigated reports of “violent 
propaganda” which included scurrilous and inflammatory language 
dehumanizing the Germans. An article in the September 9, 1942 edition of the 
newspaper Red Star included these comments: 
The Germans are not human beings. Henceforth the 
word German means to us the most terrible curse. From 
now on the word German will trigger your rifle. We shall 
not speak any more. We shall not get excited. We shall 
kill. If you have not killed at least one German a day, you 
have wasted that day. … Kill the German – this is what 
your children beseech you to do. Kill the German – this 
is the cry of your Russian earth. Do not waver. Do not let 
up. Kill.” (de Zayas, 1979, 168-169) 
 
Other alleged incidents investigated by the Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau 
include the execution of wounded German soldiers by Russian soldiers in the 
Crimea on January 1, 1942 (de Zayas, 1979, 180-182); the alleged existence of a 
so-called “Stalin Order” ordering all German prisoners of war should be shot 





murder of 596 German POWs and other personnel by Soviet soldiers in Grischino, 
north of Stalino, on February 18, 1943 (de Zayas, 1979, 187-191); the “murder of  
thousands of Ukrainian and Polish political prisoners by the NKVD” in Lvov, 
Poland in June 1941 (de Zayas, 1979, 214-227); the 1940 liquidation of some  
14,700 Polish prisoners of war by Soviet authorities at the Katyn forest near 
Smolensk in the Soviet Union in 1940, discovered and investigated in the spring  
of 1943 (de Zayas, 1979, 228-239); the discovery in 1941 in Vinnitsa of mass 
graves containing the remains of thousands of Ukrainians (9,439 were counted) 
(de Zayas, 1979, 240-244); and attacks by Allied aircraft on German hospital ships 
(de Zayas, 1979, 261-268).  
In a long letter to President Roosevelt dated April 23, 1943, Stalin 
vehemently denied Soviet responsibility for the Katyn forest massacre.  
Dispensing with the usual diplomatic formalities in favor of blunt language 
interspersed with stock Soviet clichés, and adopting a tone of self-righteous 
anger and indignation, Stalin disclaimed all Soviet involvement and branded as a 
sham efforts by the Polish government in exile, based in London and led by 
Wladyslaw Sikorski, to investigate the matter: 
The governments of Sikorski and Hitler have involved in 
these “investigations” the International Red Cross 
which is compelled to take part under conditions of a 
terroristic regime with its gallows and mass 
extermination of a peaceful population, in this 
investigation farce, under the stage management of 
Hitler. (Butler, 2005, 124) 
 
Stalin also accused the Polish government in exile, which was a member of the  
 








forest incident to discredit the Soviet Union:  
 
At the time when the people of the Soviet Union are 
shedding their blood in the bitter struggle against 
Hitlerite Germany and straining every effort to rout the 
common foe of all liberty-loving democratic countries, 
the government of Mr. Sikorski, pandering to Hitler’s 
tyranny, is dealing a treacherous blow to the Soviet 
Union. 
 
All these circumstances force the Soviet Government to 
infer that the present government of Poland, having  
fallen into the path of collusion with the Hitler 
government, has actually discontinued relations of 
alliance with the USSR and assumed a hostile attitude 
toward the Soviet Union. (Butler, 2005, 124) 
 
Three days later, on April 26, 1943, Roosevelt sent Stalin this reply:  
 
I can well understand your problem but I hope in present 
situation you can find means to label your action as a 
suspension of conversation with the Polish Government 
in exile rather than a complete severance of diplomatic 
relations. 
 
It is my view that Sikorski has not acted in any way with 
Hitler gang, but rather that he made a stupid mistake in 
taking the matter up with the International Red Cross. 
(Butler, 2005, 126) 
 
The warmth of Roosevelt’s reply and his attempt to calm the Soviet dictator is 
indicative of Roosevelt’s skill as a diplomat and the goodwill he felt for Stalin. 
Whether Roosevelt’s goodwill was misguided is a matter for speculation. 
Both Hitler and Stalin were implicated in the Katyn Forest massacre. Each 
one accused the other of having committed the crime. Given the reputations of 
the respective complainants, both of whom had a motive for heaping blame on 
the other, establishing culpability remained elusive. To Stalin, this matter was 




war and to Hitler, this matter was worth exploiting as a way of sowing disunity 
within the ranks of his enemies. The controversy was driven not by the desire for  
justice but by pure expediency. For by impugning one, the other would be 
strengthened. That thousands of Polish POWs were murdered no one disputed.  
On April 13, 1990 the Soviet Union admitted that its secret police, the NKVD, 
committed the murders (Reuters, 4/13/90). In 1992 more evidence surfaced  
showing that on March 5, 1940 the murders were ordered by the Politburo chaired 
by Stalin (Chicago Tribune, 10/15/92). But one thing is certain: whether Stalin 
personally signed a document authorizing the murders is of less importance than 
the fact that they are now part of his legacy and that of the regime that for fifty 
years sought to cover up a war crime. It also lends some small credibility to the 
findings of Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau. 
 Pure expediency too had motivated Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union to 
sign the Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939. Here both Hitler and Stalin 
demonstrated willingness to put aside ideological differences and jeopardize 
world peace in order to pursue their own respective foreign policy agendas. 
Besides agreeing not to fight each other, Germany and the Soviet Union divided 
Eastern Europe into respective spheres, one for Germany and the other for the 
Soviet Union, giving each side carte blanche to invade and occupy those 
countries located in their respective spheres. Most critically, the pact made 
provisions for the elimination of Poland. This proviso gave Hitler the green light 
to invade that country and start another war which three days later escalated into 




Benito Mussolini’s Foreign Minister, directly warned the German foreign ministry 
that an attack on Poland would lead to war with Britain and France (Sonntag and 
Beddie, 2003, 79). Ciano’s warning was rejected. Both Hitler and Stalin share 
responsibility for causing the war. 
 One can only marvel at how Stalin and Hitler tried to sucker deceive the 
other, extending false feelers of friendship while concealing their real intentions.  
Their sordid brinksmanship is without equal in history. By treating with Hitler, 
Stalin was playing a high risk game with a man who had already double-crossed 
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and who was looking for an excuse to 
start a fight. For Hitler, treating with Stalin meant dealing with a man who was 
looking for a dupe through which to destroy the West.  Both were up to no good 
and both were willing to employ any means to accomplish their aims. 
 If both Hitler and Stalin bear joint responsibility for having caused the war 
and are implicated in the commission of war crimes, then the question arises as 
to whether Hitler has been judged according to a double standard. Can the Nazi 
regime be considered criminal and the USSR not?  This raises a legal principle 
called tu quoque. Tu quoque is a Latin term meaning “you also.” It operates as 
follows: Party A accuses Party B of having violated a law, but Party A ostensibly 
violated the same law, so Party B can claim innocence, or at least mitigation, 
since Party A committed the same offense too. By invoking this defense, a 
defendant can deflect or blunt a prosecution. It can also be used by a plaintiff to 
rationalize their own actions. At the Nuremberg War Crimes trial some of the 




under narrow circumstances, it was not employed. Franz Von Papen, one of the 
defendants at Nuremberg, called tu quoque a bad defense (Tusa and Tusa, 1985, 
251). It was also disallowed by the court on the grounds that it would result in 
“fishing expeditions” (Tusa and Tusa, 1985, 252). As the evidence showed, the 
Nazi regime bore full responsibility for their actions and had no legal basis to 
project blame onto their accusers or claim mitigating circumstances. 
 So, if that is the case, then why bring up German allegations of Allied war 
crimes?  The purpose is to show that applying the label “war criminal” alone 
proves nothing. Throughout the war the Germans accused the Allies of war 
crimes. But their accusations itself did not confer guilt. Although it is tempting to 
label Hitler and Stalin names and complain about their actions, such expressions 
of self-righteousness only reduce Hitler and Stalin to caricatures, deflects 
attention away from the facts relating to their respective cases and opens up their 
detractors to charges of hypocrisy. That Hitler and Stalin committed bad acts is a 
given. That they acted on their own volition is a given. To label them as bad is 
therefore superfluous. Besides, not everyone who knew them thought they were 
bad. Hitler’s family physician, who was forced to flee from Austria, had good 
things to say about the Fuhrer. It is what they did according to the record that 
counts. Name calling and labeling merely perpetuates stereotypes. 
 
 Now it is time to examine who Hitler and Stalin were and what they actually 
did. Comparing Hitler and Stalin implies that they were similar enough to warrant 




Austrian from Central Europe while Stalin was Georgian from the Caucasus. 
Hitler served in the military while Stalin was rejected for military service. Hitler 
was single (except for one day) while Stalin was married twice. Hitler had no 
children while Stalin had two sons and a daughter. Hitler was a Nazi while Stalin 
was a Communist. These are material differences and ideological which set both 
men apart.  
Hitler and Stalin also had much in common. Both were dictators, that is, 
they had unlimited executive authority, free from legal constraints, meaning that 
their orders were de facto law. Both led and were identified with radical political 
parties – Hitler as head of the Nazi Party; Stalin as General Secretary of the 
Communist Party. Prior to gaining power, both were political activists – Hitler as a 
street agitator and Stalin as a revolutionary agent.  Both claimed to represent the 
interests of a specific social group – Hitler, the German Volk and Stalin, the 
proletariat. Both employed terror to achieve their political aims – Hitler through 
the Gestapo, and Stalin through a variety of Soviet security organizations. Both  
surrounded themselves with a loyal clique of followers who did their master’s 
bidding – Hitler with a group including SS commandant Heinrich Himmler, 
propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, and Reichmarshall Herman Goering 
(Bullock, 1992, 321), and Stalin with associates such as Politburo members Lazar 
Kaganovich, Soviet foreign minister Vyasheslav M. Molotov and state security 
commissar Lavrenti Beria (Bullock, 1992, 114, 304).  Both were brought up as 
Christians, Hitler as Catholic and Stalin as Russian Orthodox, and later both 




Christianity die a natural death” (Hitler, Table Talks, 2000, 8, 48). Stalin wrote, 
“[T]he world is by its very nature material … and that the world develops in 
accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a 
‘universal spirit’” (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 412). Both had expansionist and 
imperialistic ambitions (Rancour-Leferriere, 1988, 79). Finally, both were directly 
responsible for the deaths of millions of people – Hitler as the perpetrator of the  
Holocaust and initiator of the Second World War, and Stalin as author of 
collectivization, the purges and the gulag. As to the actual number of victims, 
political scientist R. J. Rummel offers these figures: 20,946,000 murdered by the 
Nazis during the period 1933 to 1945 (Rummel, 1992, 6), and 5,104,000 murdered 
by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the period 1939 to June 1941 
alone (Rummel, 1990, 127). According to Rummel, the total number of people 
murdered by the Soviet government from 1917 to 1987 was 61,911,000 (Rummel, 
1990, 1). Historian Richard Overy writes, “The regimes defined their enemies and  
destroyed or removed them” (Overy, 2004, 634). Not surprisingly, the two 
dictators on some level admired each other (Fest, 1975, 593). 
Despite their similarities, which were substantial, some historians have 
argued that one was worse than the other. Let us examine what two historians 
have had to say on this matter. They are Joachim Fest and Alan Bullock. Fest 
believes that Hitler was worse than Stalin. He argues that Hitler had “ … absolutely 
no civilizing ideas” while Stalin’s “bloody despotism draped itself with promises 





Did Hitler really have absolutely no civilizing ideas? It is at least true that Hitler 
had moments of insight. On August 2, 1941, Hitler said, “I don’t blame the small 
man for turning Communist, but I blame the intellectual who did nothing but 
exploit other people’s poverty for their own ends” (Hitler, 2000, 18) There is 
nothing in this statement that is inherently or explicitly uncivil or unreasonable. 
Further, it reveals that Hitler, the avowed enemy of Bolshevism, had sufficient 
understanding to appreciate why someone would become a Communist.  
Now, regarding Fest’s characterization of Stalin’s regime as a “bloody 
despotism,” these words evoke negative images and could lead one to 
reasonably conclude that Stalin was an ogre and the Soviet State an abomination. 
Is such a conclusion accurate? Historian Robert Conquest would say yes. In his 
book The Great Terror, which discusses Stalin’s role as the initiator of the great 
purge of the late 1930s, Conquest writes: “Neither then nor later was his terrorism 
wholly rational. He practiced brutal violence, not only toward everything that 
opposed him but also toward that which seemed, to his capricious and despotic 
character, contrary to his concepts” (Conquest, 1990, 66). So, at this point, the 
question must be asked: who was actually worse: Hitler who, according to Fest, 
had no civilizing ideas or Stalin who, according to two eminent historians, was 
essentially a thug?  
The issue becomes even cloudier when we introduce yet another source 
that seems to refute both Fest and Conquest. That source is Adolf Hitler. On the 





Stalin is one of the most extraordinary figures in world 
history. He began as a small clerk, and never stopped 
being a clerk. Stalin owes nothing to rhetoric. He  
governs from his office, thanks to a bureaucracy that 
obeys his every nod and gesture. (Hitler, 2007, 9) 
 
To Hitler, Stalin was the head bureaucrat of an administrative apparatus that was 
completely subservient to his will. Hitler’s foreign office expressed similar views. 
When Stalin took over the office of Chairman of the Council of People’s 
Commissars in May 6, 1941 (the first time Stalin ever held a government post), the 
German ambassador to the Soviet Union, Count von der Schulenburg, wrote,  
“Stalin won his position of power in party and state solely by his personal 
authority and by the aid of men devoted to him” (Sonntag and Beddie, 2003, 336). 
Neither Hitler nor Schulenburg use language that explicitly or implicitly demonize 
Stalin. 
 Another contemporary of Stalin’s actually held the Soviet leader in high 
esteem. That person was Franklin D. Roosevelt. Despite the anti-Soviet bias that 
pervaded the State Department and War Department during the war, Roosevelt 
directed that the Soviet Union be treated fairly, with no strings attached. 
Roosevelt himself developed a warm relationship with Stalin. He seemed to 
genuinely like the Communist dictator. Evidence of Roosevelt’s feelings for Stalin 
can be found in the series of correspondence between the two men during the 
war. In a letter to Stalin dated April 11, 1942, Roosevelt wrote: 
The American people are thrilled by the magnificent 
fighting of your armed forces and we want to help you in 
the destruction of Hitler’s armies and material more than 






In a letter to Roosevelt dated April 20, 1942, Stalin replied:  
Let me thank you for the message which I received in 
Moscow the other day. …. Please accept my sincere 
regards and wishes of success in the fight against the 
enemies of the United States of America. (Butler, 2005, 
65) 
 
In a letter dated August 8, 1942, Roosevelt asked Stalin for advice on whether to 
send Wendell Willkie to the Soviet Union as part of a diplomatic mission.  The 
letter opens with this sentence:  
I should like to have your frank opinion on the following 
plan which I think may be useful.  
 
and closes with this sentence:  
Please tell me confidentially and frankly if you care to 
have him come for a very short visit. (Butler, 2005, 82-83) 
 
Four days later Stalin replied:  
The Soviet Government takes a favorable view of Mr. 
Wendell Willkie’s visit to the USSR and I can assure you 
that he will be most cordially entertained. (Butler, 2005, 
83) 
 
October 5, 1942, Roosevelt wrote:  
 
I send you my heartiest congratulations on the 
magnificent achievements of the Soviet Armies  
and my best wishes for your continued welfare.  
(Butler, 2005, 92) 
 
On November 19, 1942 Roosevelt wrote:  
 
I do not have to tell you to keep up the good work.  You 
are doing that and I honestly feel that things everywhere 
look brighter. (Butler, 2005, 97) 
 
Regarding American air assistance in the Caucasus, Roosevelt, on December 16,  
 








Please let me know inform me by dispatch your desires 
in this matter as soon as possible, as I truly want to help 
all I can. (Butler, 2005, 104) 
 
On February 4, 1943, Roosevelt wrote:  
 
As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the 
United States I congratulate you on your brilliant victory 
in Stalingrad. (Butler, 2005, 114) 
 
The next day Stalin sent Roosevelt this reply:  
 
I thank you for the congratulations in connection with 
the victory of the Soviet armies at Stalingrad. I express 
confidence that the joint fighting operations of the 
armed forces of the United States, of Great Britain and 
of the Soviet Union will soon lead to victory over our 
common enemy. (Butler, 2005, 115) 
 
On February 22, 1943 Roosevelt wrote:  
 
We hope that the success of your heroic army, which is 
an inspiration to all of us, will continue. (Butler, 2005, 119) 
 
The same day Roosevelt sent Stalin another letter which said:  
 
On behalf of the people of the United States, I want to 
express to the Red Army, on its twenty-fifth anniversary, 
our profound admiration for its magnificent 
achievements unsurpassed in all history. … The Red 
Army and the Russian people have surely started the 
Hitler forces on the road to ultimate defeat and have 
earned the lasting admiration of the people of the  
United States. (Butler, 2005, 119-120) 
 
Two days later Stalin replied:  
 
Please accept my sincere gratitude for your friendly 
message on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the 
Red Army and for your high praise of its fighting 
successes. I share your confidence that these 
successes will open the path to the final defeat of our 
common foe who should and will be crushed by the  
united might of our countries and of all freedom loving 








Even Stalin was capable of showing gratitude. Of course, whether Stalin’s  
 
solicitations were genuine or a cynical guise meant to extract favors from  
 
the American president is another matter. Was Roosevelt being naïve? Historian 
Susan Butler believes Roosevelt wanted to maintain friendly relations with Stalin 
because he wanted to win the war and the peace that would follow (Butler, 2005, 
10). Roosevelt’s true motivations can only be speculated about. 
Stalin professed a desire to be friends with the United States. In a letter to 
President Roosevelt dated January 18, 1939, Joseph Davies, US Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union, reported: 
The leaders of the Soviet government have stated to me 
that there is only one government in the world that they 
trust and that is the United States government under 
your leadership. (Davies, 1941, 433). 
 
In a letter to Roosevelt’s closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, dated July 18, 1941, 
Davis wrote: 
I found among the leading Soviets a real friendliness to 
the United States possibly based on the fact that there 
was nothing that they had that we wanted, and that we 
had nothing that they could take; so there was a natural 
basis for a policy of “live and let live” between our two 
peoples. (Davies, 1941, 496), 
 
Roosevelt responded to Soviet overtures in kind and during the war the Soviet  
 
Union proved a staunch ally. 
 
The question of Stalin’s character becomes even more unsettled when we 
introduce Stalin’s own words. Although excoriated by many historians today, 
Stalin believed that his policies were right.  In fact, he was proud of his 




Stalin was asked, “Was the party right in pursuing the policy of accelerating 
development to the utmost?” Stalin replied: 
Yes, it was absolutely right. We had to spur on the 
country, which was a hundred years behind, and which 
was faced with mortal danger because it was behind. 
Only in this way was it possible to enable the country to 
quickly re-equip itself on the basis of modern technique 
and emerge onto the highroad at last. 
 
What exactly had the party under Stalin achieved? In a report delivered to the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party on January 7, 1933, Stalin answers 
that question: 
We did not have an iron and steel industry, the 
foundation for the industrialization of the country. Now 
we have this industry. 
 
We did not have a tractor industry. Now we have one. 
 
We did not have an automobile industry. Now we have 
one. 
 
We did not have a machine-tool industry. Now we have 
one. 
 
We did not have a big and up-to-date chemical industry. 
Now we have one. 
 
We did not have a real and big industry for the 
production of modern agricultural machinery. Now we 
have one. 
 
We did not have an aircraft industry. Now we have one. 
 
Stalin goes on to list many more impressive accomplishments (Stalin, Leninism, 
1942, 246-252, 258-262). He then compares the results achieved in the Soviet 
Union with figures from the West: “While by the end of 1932 the volume of 




of industrial output in the USA during the same period dropped to 56 percent, in 
England to 80 percent, in Germany to 55 percent, in Poland to 54 percent” (Stalin, 
Leninism, 1942, 248). Stalin rejected “all the talk of the bourgeois press about the 
‘collapse’ of collectivization in the sphere of agriculture” and compared Soviet 
accomplishments in agriculture with the condition of agriculture in the United 
States. Stalin reported: 
According to the figures of the United States 
Department of Agriculture, the value of the gross 
output of agriculture in the United States dropped from 
$11,000,000,000 in 1929 to $5,000,000,000 in 1932, i.e., 
by more than 50 percent. (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 255) 
 
Stalin also reported that in the Soviet Union unemployment had been abolished 
 
while in the West unemployment was worsening. Stalin reported: 
 
In the United States, according to official figures, the 
number of employed workers in the manufacturing 
industries alone has dropped from 8,500,000 in 1928 to 
5,500,000 in 1932; and according to the figures of the 
American Federation of Labor, the number of 
unemployed in the United States, in all industries, at the 
end of 1932, was 11,000,000. In Great Britain, according 
to official statistics, the number of unemployed has 
increased from 1,290,000 in 1928 to 2,800,000 in 1932. 
In Germany, according to official figures, the number of  
unemployed has increased from 1,376,000 in 1928 to 
5,500,000 in 1932. This is the picture that is observed in 
all the capitalist countries. Moreover, official statistics, 
as a rule, minimize the number of unemployed; the total 
number of those unemployed in the capitalist countries  
ranges from 35,000,000 to 40,000,000. (Stalin, Leninism, 
1942, 261) 
 
If one was to believe Stalin, when compared to the situation in the West, the  
 










As though to prove that his glowing reports of Soviet successes were not 
merely self-serving, Stalin quoted verbatim reports from the Western press both 
praising and criticizing the Five Year Plan. The New York Times (November 1932) 
called it a “gamble” and a “ghastly failure.” The English newspaper, the Daily 
Telegraph (November 1932), reported that “the scheme has quite clearly failed.” 
The Polish newspaper Gazeta Polska (summer 1932) reported that “The situation 
[in the rural districts] … has reached an impasse.”  The English newspaper, The 
Financial Times (November 1932), referred to the “breakdown of the Five Year 
Plan,” while the Italian magazine Politica reported, “Catastrophe is evident.”  
Other reports, however, presented a much more positive picture. The 
French newspaper, Le Temps (January 1932) reported, “The U.S.S.R. has won the 
first round, having industrialized herself without the aid of foreign capital.” In the 
summer it later said that “in the contest with us the Bolsheviks have proved the 
victors.” The British magazine, The Round Table, reported, “The developments 
achieved under the Five Years Plan is astounding.” The Financial Times also 
noted that “the progress made in machine construction cannot be doubted, and 
the celebrations of it in the press and on the platform, glowing as they are, are 
not unwarranted.” The Austrian newspaper, Die Neue Freie Presse (beginning of 
1932), added, “We may curse Bolshevism, but we must understand it…. The Five 
Year Plan is a new huge quantity which must be taken into account in every 
economic calculation.” John Gibson Garvie, the chairman of the United 
Dominions Trust (October 1932) said, “Russia is forging ahead while all too many 




an ideal …. I believe that the Russian objective is sound.” The American journal, 
The Nation (November 1932), opined, “The four years of the Five-Year Plan have 
witnessed truly remarkable developments.  The face of the country is being 
changed literarily beyond recognition. … Russia is passing quickly from the age 
of wood into an age of iron, steel, concrete and motors. The English journal, The 
Glasgow Forward (September 1932), reported (unsurprisingly):  
Nobody can fail to notice the enormous amount of 
building work that is going on….It has to be seen to be 
believed. Our own war time efforts … are flea-bites to 
what has been done in Russia…. So dismiss from your 
heads the fantastic scare stories of the British press 
that lies so persistently, so blatantly, so contemptibly 
about Russia, and all the half-truths and misconceptions 
that are circulated by the dilettante literary academic 
intelligentsia that look at Russia patronizingly through 
superior middle-class spectacles without having the 
slightest understanding of what is going on. 
 
Based on these figures and reports, Stalin concluded, not unreasonably, that the 
Soviet system had the advantage over the capitalist system and “that the 
capitalist countries are pregnant with proletarian revolution” (Stalin, Leninism, 
1942, 236-240, 241). 
Stalin also made another essential point: industrialization had to be 
spurred on to protect the Soviet Union from impending attack. One could argue 
that his fears were exaggerated. But were they? In 1921, Lenin warned that there 
would be another world war: 
The question of imperialist wars, of the international 
policy of finance capital which dominates the whole 
world, a policy the inevitably engenders new imperialist  
wars, that inevitably causes an extreme intensification 
of national oppression, pillage, brigandry and the 







by a handful of “advanced” powers – this question has 
been the keystone of the entire policy of all countries of 
the globe since 1914. It is a question of life and death for 
millions and millions of people. It is a question of 
whether 20,000,000 people (as compared with the 
10,000,000 who were killed in the war of 1914-1918 and 
in the supplementary “minor” wars that are still going 
on) are to be slaughtered in the next imperialist war, 
which the bourgeoisie is preparing, which is growing 
out of capitalism before our very eyes. It is a question of  
whether that future war, which is inevitable (if capitalism 
continues to exist), 60,000,000 people are to be maimed  
(compared to the 30,000,000 maimed in the years 1914-
1918). (Lenin, Selected Works, v.2, pt.2, 597-598) 
 
Lenin’s warnings proved to be correct, even if his explanation was flawed.  
Stalin believed that his policies were justified; his explanations seemed rational 
and plausible. According to President Roosevelt, he was an ally worthy of lasting  
admiration. Stalin believed, as US Ambassador Joseph Davies reported in 1938, that 
he was doing what had to be done to save the cause (Davies, 1941, 303). For Stalin, 
the decision to radically transform the Communist state from a backward peasant 
country into a modern industrial power was “a matter of life and death” (SMS, video). 
Opposition was out of the question; there was no time to waste. According to 
Professor David Reynolds, Stalin “dragged Russia into the twentieth century, but it  
could not have been accomplished without the utter ruthlessness that was his 
trademark” (SMS, video).  
Yet, despite the brutality of his methods, Stalin was still capable of 
performing acts of friendship and showing affection. In August 1942, Churchill 
flew to Moscow where he had a series of meetings with Stalin regarding the  
conduct of the war. Offended by Stalin’s accusations of bad faith, Churchill was 




apartment for drinks. Churchill accepted and for six hours both men, 
accompanied by Molotov, ate, drank, talked and became friends. During their 
discussions, Stalin “laughed and joked” and even introduced Churchill to his 
daughter Svetlana. Churchill left the meeting with “a new confidence in Stalin.”  
About the meeting, Churchill later said, “I was taken into the family, we ended as 
friends.” Churchill also said, “Stalin was a man with whom I could do business.”  
In the words of Professor Reynolds, the bruiser had become a charmer, a “Mister 
Nice Guy” (SMS, video). When Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, was little,  
Stalin used to carry her in his arms, give her loud kisses and call her pet names 
like “little sparrow” and “little fly.” (Rancour-Leferriere, 1988, 58). Whether 
Stalin’s shows of affection and friendship were sincere (as they probably were in 
the case of his daughter) or a mere sham is a matter for speculation.  
Bullock also believes that Hitler was worse. He argues that what sets Hitler 
apart was the Holocaust.  Nothing done by Stalin – not the purges, the show trials, the 
Gulags, the deportations – matched Hitler’s program to exterminate the Jews.  For 
Bullock, that placed Hitler in a different category.  Bullock writes: “The  
inhumanity and excesses of the Stalinist repression were as unique in different ways, 
as those of the Nazis, but they did not cancel out the uniqueness of the Holocaust” 
(Bullock, 974). Bullock is correct if in fact the Holocaust was a unique event. But was it?  
Before answering that question, anti-Semitism must first be discussed. The 
Holocaust did not occur in a vacuum; something drove it and that was Nazi anti-
Semitism. Was the anti-Semitism of Adolf Hitler unique? The historical evidence 




When Hitler took power in 1933, anti-Semitism was part of mainstream 
European thought. In fact, it was pervasive (Hildebrandt, 2009, 886). Hitler did not it. 
Jews were despised. In no country were they fully trusted or accepted.  Civil 
emancipation by Napoleon did not translate into greater tolerance; the nineteenth  
century marked the emergence of a virulent form of racial anti-Semitism (Steiman, 
1998, 114, 117-142). Jews were labeled and portrayed as radicals, plutocrats, 
cosmopolitans and subversives (Bing, online). French socialist Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon described Jews as “fraudulent” and “parasitic” (Lewis, 1986, 111).  
Their patriotism was considered a sham and their loyalty questioned.  Historian 
Bernard Lewis writes that Jews were depicted as aliens to the nation (Lewis, 1986, 68). 
In 1847 Otto von Bismarck, as a member of the Landtag (and years before he became 
chancellor of Germany), expressed the belief that Jews should not have access of all 
public offices since it would be incompatible with the Christian character of the state 
(Katz, 1973, 198).  In 1875 in Hungary a parliamentary deputy began demanding the 
expulsion of Jews from the country (Ettinger, 1976, 876). From September 1879 in 
Germany the Christian Social Workers’ Party concentrated its efforts on anti-Jewish  
agitation (Ettinger, 1976, 875). (Later on Adolf Hitler would characterize the CSWP’s 
anti-Semitism as only “half-hearted” (Hitler, 1998, 120)).  In 1891 in France a deputy 
proposed that Jews be expelled from the country; thirty-two deputies supported him 
(Ettinger, 1976, 878). In 1893, sixteen deputies were elected to the Reichstag on a 
specifically anti-Semitic platform (Laqueur, 2001, 29). In 1894 in France, as part of a  
campaign to discredit the loyalty of Jews, a French-Jewish military officer Alfred 




followed by anti-Semitic demonstrations and riots in nearly seventy towns and cities 
(Marrus, 1987, 60). Historian Michael Marrus writes, “Anti-Semitism was deeper and 
more pervasive than a mere passing fever” (Marrus, 1987, xxvii). The nineteenth 
century German philosopher Eugen Duhring attributed the cause of “Jewish depravity”  
to “Jewish blood” (Fischer, 1998, 103). In 1910 the English social philosopher and 
historian Houston Stewart Chamberlain, son-in-law of the German composer  
Richard Wagner, warned that the Jews, through “the law of blood,” could achieve 
mastery of Europe: 
Consider with what mastery they use the law of blood to                                                                                                                                                                                
extend their power; the principal stem remains spotless, 
not a drop of strange blood comes in; as it stands in the 
Thora, “A bastard shall not enter into the congregation of 
the Lord; even to his tenth generation shall he not enter 
into the congregation of the Lord.” (Deuteronomy, xxiii, 2); 
in the meantime, however, thousands of side branches 
are cut off and employed to infect the Indo-Europeans 
with Jewish blood. If that were to go on for a few 
centuries, there would be in Europe only one single 
people of pure race, that of the Jews, all the rest would be 
a herd of pseudo-Hebraic mestizos, a people beyond all 
doubt degenerate physically, mentally and morally. 
(Chamberlain, 1910, 331) 
 
The theme of the Jews as a separate race posing a threat to the state is also 
contained in the writings of the German philosopher and historian Oswald Spengler. 
Discussing the racial characteristics of the Jewish people, Spengler in 1926 wrote:  
It is stated that even today Jews can amongst 
themselves distinguish very different races at the first 
glance, and that in the ghettos of eastern Europe the 
“tribes” (in the Old Testament sense) are clearly 
recognized. But none of this constitutes a different  
nation. According to von Erckert, the West European 









non-Jewish Caucasian peoples, whereas according to 
Weissenberg it does not occur at all amongst the long-
headed Jews of southern Arabia, where Sabaen  
tomb-sculptures show a human type that might also 
claim to be Roman or Germanic and is the ancestor of 
these Jews who were converted by missionary effort at 
least by the birth of Christ. (Spengler, v. 2, 1926, 175-176) 
 
Spengler goes on to discuss the historical relationship of minority groups to the 
state and implied that it is the duty of the state to suppress these minority groups 
if they pose a threat to the identity of the state:  
If Christians lived in the Islamic State, Nestorians in the 
Persian, Jews in the Byzantine, they did not and could 
not as unbelievers belong to it, and consequently were  
thrown back upon their own jurisdictions. If by reason of 
their numbers or their missionary spirit they became a 
threat to the continuance of the identity of the state and 
creed-community, persecution became a national duty. 
(Spengler, v. 2, 1926, 177-178) 
 
Self-preservation, not pluralism nor tolerance, is the message conveyed. The 
minority group is the enemy and poses a direct threat to the community by virtue 
of their difference which is defined by race. Persecution is not only an option. It is 
a duty.  
Hitler was not a political philosopher, nor did he have much formal 
education. But he was a voracious reader with a strong interest in history. 
According to historian Brigitte Hamann, as a young man in Vienna Hitler got his 
information from books at the public library, booklets published by political 
parties and associations, and newspapers (Hamann, 1999, 200-201). Years later, 
after becoming Fuhrer, he would talk about topics he remembered from his youth. 





order, a bona fide mental chest of drawers from which he knew how to profit 
optimally.” (Hamann, 1999, 201). 
Further evidence of cultural influences which shaped Hitler’s thinking can 
be found in Mein Kampf, published in 1925. In this book, written while in prison, 
Hitler spelled out his political and racial agenda. From 1905 to 1913, ages 16 to 23,  
Hitler had lived in Vienna, the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the time 
Vienna, with a population of two million people, was the sixth largest city in the 
world (Hamann, 1999, 277). Circulating around Vienna was a whole range of anti-
Semitic and racial theories. Although crudely expressed and devoid of scientific 
value, these gained traction and attracted a large public following, that even 
included some Jews such as Otto Weiniger and Arthur Trebitisch (Hamann, 1999, 
227-235). Talk of a “master race” and “inferior races” was everywhere. Everything 
was explained by way of race (Hamann, 1999, 204). One theory asserted that Jews 
were dangerous because they were spoiling the Aryan “noble race” through 
mixed marriages (Hamann, 1999, 208). Another purported that they were weak 
and not able to live independently, thus representing a parasitic life form, and 
that “every people has the right to vigorously fight the willful and deliberate 
deterioration of its race” (Hamann, 1999, 223)” Another insisted that 
anthropologically the Jews were related to “Mongols” and “Negroes”: 
The curly hair points to the Negro, and the complete 
Chinese and Malaysian shapes of their skulls, which one 
so often encounters among the Jews – who then also  
invariably have a yellowish complexion – point to partly 
Mongolian blood2 (Hamann, 1999, 228-229)  
 
                                                          







Another theory declared that: 
 
it is the duty of the Nordic man, who has ripened under 
a colder sky, to eliminate the parasitic races just as one  
simply has to eliminate dangerous poisonous snakes 
and wild beasts of prey. (Hamann, 1999, 241-242) 
 
Another theory, and this one is especially noteworthy in view of what subsequently 
transpired, warned that: 
the Jews were fighting along with the Socialists, the 
Catholics, the Jesuits, and the Freemasons to ruin the 
Aryans and seize power. Thus the German people are in 
danger of perishing if it does not defend itself. It also 
needs a leader who is “born and sent by God. Yet to 
serve the will of such a Fuhrer means submitting 
oneself to the total will of the entire German people and  
serving that will, which has remained mute so far and 
become loud and clear only through this leader.” 
(Hamann, 1999, 232) 
 
There is no doubt that during the seven years that Hitler lived in Vienna he was 
exposed to these and similar ideas. This was witnessed by people who knew him.  
Of course, one could argue that exposure alone would not necessarily 
transform someone into a fanatical, race-baiting anti-Semite. But the mayor of 
Vienna, Karl Lueger (as well as many members of the Vienna city council), was a 
notorious anti-Semite and provided Hitler, a highly impressionable person who 
fancied himself an artist, with a political role model.  It was Lueger who said that 
anti-Semitism would “perish, but not until the last Jew has perished”(Hamann, 
1999, 286, 290). A Lueger associate Josef Gregori stated in the Reichsrat, “I 
would very much like to see all Jews ground into artificial fertilizer … I would like 
that very much” and “If you go and hang 3,000 stock exchange Jews today, wheat 




(Hamann, 1999, 287). An anti-Semitic pamphlet speculated what the provinces of 
the the Austro-Hungarian Empire would be like in 1920 had Vienna being renamed 
Luegerville and the city was “Jew-free” because the Christians had driven the 
“flatfeet,” “crooked-noses,” and “Yiddish gabbers” to Budapest by means of a 
total economic embargo (Hamann, 1999, 294). 
Hitler incorporated these ideas and others into Mein Kampf. The struggle 
against the Jews would be a crusade. Hitler wrote, “By defending myself against 
the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord” (Hitler, 1998, 65).  
The idea of man as heroic avenger had already been rooted in the writings 
of German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer writes:  
It is a rare, very significant, and even sublime trait of 
character through which the individual sacrifices 
himself by striving to make himself the arm of eternal 
justice, of the true nature of which he is yet ignorant. 
(Schopenhauer, v.1, 1968, 463-464) 
  
To take on a cause was not only heroic, it was magnificent.  
Regarding the need to maintain and protect the purity of blood Hitler wrote, 
“There is only one holiest human right, and this right is at the same time the 
holiest obligation, to wit: to see to it that the blood is preserved pure and, by 
preserving the best humanity, to create the possibility of a nobler development of 
these beings” (Hitler, 1998, 402). The connection between this statement and the 
theories of race that were being spread in Vienna at the time Hitler lived there is 
obvious. (The parallel between this notion of creating a superior race of people 





particular ideals to be cultivated might have been different. The murderous 
ruthlessness with which it was pursued was not.) 
On the need for Germans to acquire their own special land, Hitler wrote, 
“We Nationalist Socialists must hold unflinchingly to our aim in foreign policy, 
namely, to secure for the German people the land and soil to which they are 
entitled on this earth” (Hitler, 1998, 652). This idea was drawn from the theories 
propounded by the Austrian Pan-German movement, which was also vehemently 
anti-Semitic. Its leader, Georg Schonerer, wrote, “We consider anyone a renegade 
of his people who knowingly supports the Jews and their agents and comrades” 
(Hamann, 1999, 243). Schonerer also warned of the need to prepare for the 
ensuing war between Germans and Jews: “If we don’t expel the Jews, we 
Germans will be expelled” (Hamann, 1999, 243). (Schonerer had people refer to 
him as the sole and absolute “Fuhrer,” a practice which Hitler later adopted.) 
(Hamann, 1999, 244, 252). 
Hitler wrote Mein Kampf to warn people of the supposed Jewish threat. He 
wrote, “For once this book has become the common property of a people, the 
Jewish menace may be considered as broken” (Hitler, 1998, 308). The connection  
between Hitler’s political agenda and the anti-Semitic ideas that were circulating 
in Vienna is self-evident. Adopting the swastika as a symbol had first been an 
idea inspired by Guido von List; the idea of a “Thousand-Year Reich” was a 
concept based on the theories of Hanns Horbiger, who taught that the course of 
world history always runs in 2,100 year-long cycles (Hamann, 1999, 209-215, 225-




That Hitler chose to exploit the prevailing anti-Semitism for his own purposes 
was an act of demagoguery, but given the cultural milieu in which he lived and 
the intensity, scope, and depth of anti-Semitic feeling at the time, this should not 
be surprising. He also very much believed in it. 
German anti-Semites were not alone in their perturbations over the Jews. 
Lenin was distressed by them too. While Lenin did not advocate an official  
policy of persecution or outright extermination, he believed that Jewish national 
aspirations were inconsistent with the goals of the proletarian revolution, and 
preferred that Jews not push the matter and make it an issue. Although he was  
willing to allow the Poles and other national groups autonomy within the larger 
Soviet state, he was not willing to extend such a privilege to the Jews, who Lenin 
considered a caste. For Lenin, the solution of the Jewish problem was  
emancipation and assimilation (Wolfe, 1964, 579). Stalin agreed, and went even 
further by claiming that Jews were already vanishing. In 1917 he wrote, “In brief, 
the Jewish nation is coming to end, and therefore there is nobody to demand 
national autonomy for. The Jews are being assimilated” (Stalin, National Question, 
1942, 40).  
Whether Stalin was anti-Semitic is a matter for conjecture. Bullock asserts 
that he was and after 1948 used Zionism as pretext to initiate an anti-Semitic 
campaign, which was centered on the so-called Doctors’ Plot (Bullock, 1991, 956-
957). Apparently Stalin believed that certain Jewish organizations inside the 
Soviet Union with ties to the United States were being used as fronts by Jews 




the USSR. (His own use of Communist parties around the world must have 
naturally inclined him to this.) Historians Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov 
write: 
With the founding of the state of Israel and outbreaks 
throughout the Soviet Union of what Stalin perceived to  
be dangerous pro-Israel, Zionist fervor in the Soviet 
Jewish population, it was alleged that Jews could not be 
trusted to be loyal to the USSR, and constituted a 
potential fifth column in case of a war with the United 
States. (Brent and Naumov, 2003, 94). 
 
Stalin was not alone in his preoccupation with Jewish subversion. In the United 
States both the House of Representatives and the Senate had in 1941 conducted  
hearings on allegations of Communist infiltration in the movie industry and the 
government (HCUA, 1947, passim; SPSI, 1953, passim). Many of those 
investigated were Jews. Ironically, while Jews in the Soviet Union were being 
accused of anti-Soviet leanings, Jewish-Americans in the US were accused of 
fronting for the Soviet Union.  
However, other evidence suggests that the subject of Stalin and  
anti-Semitism is far more complex. Both Stalin’s daughter-in-law and his 
daughter Svetlana’s first husband were Jewish, as was one of his closest 
associates, Lazar Kaganovich. Stalin had three grandchildren who were half  
Jewish. (In 1999, one of his grandchildren, Yevgeny Djugashvili, sued a Russian 
newspaper for libel over a report that his grandfather had ordered killings of 
Soviet citizens.) (Faulconbridge, 8/31/09). Under Stalin, no laws or regulations 





inquiry from the Jewish News Agency, Stalin issued a statement categorically 
denouncing anti-Semitism: 
National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the 
misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of 
cannibalism. Anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial 
chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of 
cannibalism. 
 
Anti-semitism is of advantage to the exploiters as a 
lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by the 
working people at capitalism. Anti-semitism is dangerous 
for the working people as being a false path that leads 
them off the right road and lands them in the jungle. Hence 
Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be 
irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-semitism. 
 
In the U.S.S.R. anti-semitism is punishable with the 
utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply 
hostile to the Soviet system. Under U.S.S.R. law active 
anti-semites are liable to the death penalty. (Stalin, 
Works, v.13, 30). 
 
Article 123 of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR, introduced under Stalin (Stalin, 
Selected Writings, 1942, 379-405), prohibited discrimination based on nationality 
or race: 
Equality of rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective 
of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, 
state, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible 
law. Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, 
conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect 
privileges for, citizens on account of their race or 
nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national 
exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by 
law. 
 
Some of Stalin’s highest ranking security officials were Jewish. They included 
Genrikh Yagoda, chief of Soviet Secret Police, Matvei Berman, Naftaly 




later support the creation of the state of Israel (Auster, 10/9/03; Bullock, 1991, 
957). 
As to whether Stalin privately was anti-Semitic, evidence suggests that in 
his youth he was (Radzinsky, 1996, 25-27). He also apparently made anti-Semitic 
statements as an adult. The evidence is anecdotal. Referring to a preponderance 
of Jews in the Menshevik faction at the London Congress of 1907, Stalin wrote: 
Apropos of that, one of the Bolsheviks jestingly 
remarked (I think it was Comrade Alexinsky) that the 
Mensheviks were a Jewish faction while the Bolsheviks 
were truly Russian, and hence it would not be amiss for  
us Bolsheviks to instigate a Pogrom in the Party. 
(Trotsky, 1967, 152) 
 
The Social Revolutionary Karganov claimed that in 1911, Stalin, in the course of 
an argument, resorted “to coarse Georgian expressions against the Jews”  
 (Trotsky, 1967, 172). According to Trotsky, Stalin’s attitude to the appearance of 
“caricatures and doggerels of anti-Semitic character in the Party press,” was one  
of “friendly neutrality” (Trotsky, 1967, 399). The so-called Doctors’ Plot in the 
early 1950s which targeted a preponderance of Jews is also cited as evidence of 
Stalin’s anti-Semitic leanings, but here too the question of Stalin’s actual 
motivations is unclear. Most of the victims had Jewish-sounding surnames, but  
the campaign was never officially designated as being aimed at Jewish citizens. 
Further, nobody knows for certain what was driving Stalin to act. Historian  
Robert Service writes:  
Whether Stalin really intended the universal deportation 
of Jews in the early 1950s remains unknown, though 
this is widely treated as a fact; and no conclusive proof 





(Paradoxically, while the loyalty of Jews to the Soviet Union was being 
questioned by Stalin, in the United States two American Jews, Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg, were convicted and executed for conspiring to commit espionage for 
the Soviet Union (Radosh and Milton, 1983, passim)). According to historians Roy 
and Zhores Medvedev, “Stalin’s anti-Semitism was fundamentally ‘political,’ 
although this can be no more than a supposition” (Medvedev, 2004, 275). Whether 
the evidence, all of which is based on innuendo, is sufficient to establish that 
Stalin was an anti-Semite is debatable.  
It could be argued that the policy of assimilation as advocated by Lenin 
and Stalin was evidence of anti-Semitic intent. For Jews assimilation would mean 
losing their cultural identity. But Stalin was not interested in preserving or 
promoting ethnic diversity; in fact the opposite: his goal was the creation of a 
dictatorship of the proletariat in which ethnic and national differences would be  
reduced and ameliorated if not altogether eliminated. Addressing the subject of 
national self-determination, Stalin wrote:  
In fighting for the right of nations to self-determination, 
the aims of the Social-Democrats is to put an end to the 
policy of national oppression, to render it impossible, 
and thereby to remove the grounds of hostility between 
nations, to take the edge off that hostility and reduce it 
to a minimum (Stalin, National Question, 1942, 23) 
  
According to Article 1, Chapter 1, clause 1 of the Russian Constitution of 1918, 
The Russian Soviet Republic was officially organized on the basis of a free union 
of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics. The operative word is 





(councils). Nationalist aspirations had no place in the Stalinist scheme, and were 
deemed a serious obstacle to the achievement of Bolshevik objectives. This is  
not to suggest that Stalin disavowed the concept of nations as a legitimate form 
of social organization. But he differentiated between what he termed “bourgeois 
nations” that were imperialistic and driven by capitalism, and “socialist nations” 
in which capitalism has been eliminated, “exempt from irreconcilable class 
contradictions that corrode the bourgeois nations, and are far more 
representative of the whole people than any bourgeois nation” (Stalin, Works. 
v.11, 354-356). As for the national aspirations of the Jews, which were expressed  
through the Jewish Bund – first, Stalin, like Lenin, did not believe that the Jews 
were a nation and therefore considered their demands for national autonomy a 
sham, and second, he believed, again like Lenin, that such aspirations, 
groundless or not, posed a threat to the working class movement. Stalin wrote: 
“The disorganization of the working-class movement, the demoralization of the  
ranks of Social-Democracy – that is where the federalism of the Bund is leading” 
(Stalin, National Question, 1942, 51). Stalin also warned of the need for the Party  
to deal with this problem. Whether Stalin’s opposition to the Jewish Bund was 
anti-Semitic or not ideological is debatable, but what is certain is that any group 
that demonstrated a tendency to deviate away from the party line on the question 
of nationalities was bound to invite Stalin’s ire. 
Hitler was not the originator of modern anti-Semitism. He was also not the 





terms of its scope the Holocaust is remarkable. It continued over a period of 
years and affected millions of people in many countries. The Lodz Ghetto,  
the Warsaw Ghetto, Kristallnacht, Dachau, Bergen-Belsen, and Auschwitz attest 
to its sheer magnitude and horror (Adelson and Lapides, 1989, passim; 
Dobroszycki, 1984, passim; Mazor, 1993, passim; Rotem, 1994, passim; Burleigh, 
2000, 325-334, 587-589, 775-776; Hoess, 1959, passim; Levi, 2006, passim; 
Steinbacher, 2005, passim). Yet the Holocaust was neither a unique historical 
occurrence, nor was it a concept that originated with Hitler. 
Throughout history, whole populations have been targeted for destruction. 
In the United States the Native American population was virtually wiped out, and 
while General Philip Sheridan did not exactly say “The only good Indian is a dead 
Indian,” his intention was nonetheless clear (Oster, 2004, 13-15, 47, 307-309; 
Brown, 2001, 1-12). In southern Africa the British forcibly subjugated the Zulus, 
and then did the same to the Afrikaners, putting many in concentration camps 
(Welsh, 1999, 262-267, 334-335). In the Congo, Belgian king Leopold II treated the 
region as his personal fiefdom, resulting in the annihilation of whole populations  
 (Hochschild, 1998, passim). During World War One the Ottoman Turks 
slaughtered Armenians in a genocidal campaign (Akcam, 2006, passim; Dadrian, 
1995, passim). Language alluding to extermination can even be found in the Bible. 
The following are excerpts from the Book of Genesis: “So the Lord said, ‘I will 
wipe from the face of the earth the human race I have created—and with them the 
animals, the birds and the creatures that move along the ground—for I regret that 




intentions: “So God said to Noah, ‘I am going to put an end to all people, for the 
earth is filled with violence because of them. I am surely going to destroy both  
them and the earth’” (The Holy Bible, Genesis 6:13). (God’s genocidal intent 
would later be restricted to such people as the Amalekites.) Hitler was not acting 
in a cultural vacuum. 
Neither was Stalin. He too was influenced by the social and historical 
forces of his time – the emergence of Marxism, the Revolution of 1905, the First 
World War, the rise of Lenin, Trotsky and the Bolshevik Party, and the February 
and October 1917 revolutions (Bullock, 1971, passim; Wolfe, 1964, passim). Nor 
did concepts such as one-party rule, political terror, and political fanaticism 
originate with him. From the September 1, 1918 edition of the Bolshevik 
newspaper, Krasnaya Gazeta:  
We will turn our hearts into steel, which we will temper 
in the fire of suffering and the blood of fighters for 
freedom. We will make our hearts cruel, hard, and 
immovable, so that no mercy will enter them, and so that  
they will not quiver at the sight of a sea of enemy blood. 
We will let loose the floodgates of that sea. Without 
mercy, without sparing, we will kill our enemies in 
scores of hundreds. Let them be thousands; let them 
drown themselves in their own blood. For the blood of 
Lenin and Uritsky, Zinovief and Volodarski, let there be  
floods of the blood of the bourgeois – more blood, as 
much as possible (World Future Fund, online) 
 
In 1906 Lenin wrote: 
 
We would be deceiving both ourselves and the people if 
we concealed from the masses the necessity of a 
desperate, bloody war of extermination, as the 
immediate task of the coming revolutionary action. 






Marxist ideology held that in a socialist state aggressive leadership was both 
necessary and inevitable. In the Communist Manifesto Marx writes, “The 
proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own  
bourgeoisie” (Marx, 1998, 49).” Marx’s ominous words would later be put into 
action by Stalin. 
Yet, unlike Hitler, who had gained power through legal means before 
declaring himself Fuhrer and therefore could assert at least a partial claim to 
political legitimacy, Stalin’s right to rule was a far less settled matter. The 
Communist Party had gained power through a coup and its effectiveness as a  
political force depended not on mass support but on maintaining a rigid 
organizational cohesiveness from the top down, and imposing and enforcing 
ideological discipline. Those in control set the party line and brooked no 
opposition. Such opposition was perceived as a direct threat to those in power. In 
the Soviet Union the man who controlled the party and set the party line        
was Joseph Stalin. His word was law. To oppose him was tantamount to inviting 
physical annihilation (Khrushchev, 1970, 564). This was the case because Stalin 
controlled the party apparatus that included the security police, whose services 
he employed to ensure compliance with party directives.  
Although Article 127 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution required that an arrest 
be made pursuant to a court order, a person could be “detained” without the 
sanction of the court or prosecutor, that is, solely on the discretion of the police, 
in “all cases where public order and security is threatened.” The Soviet judicial 




formalities were dispensed with. As a result, there were many arrests and prisons 
quickly became overcrowded, resulting in conditions that were deplorable and 
inhumane. For instance, in some Siberian towns, when the overflow was too great,  
prisoners were herded into pits dug in the ground and roofed over. In Kharkov in 
1937 a prison built for around 800 held around 12,000. In Novosibirsk, about 270 
men were crammed into a forty-square-meter cell (Conquest, The Great Terror, 
1990, 264).  
 Stalin himself admitted that the situation got out of hand, especially in the 
countryside during the initial period of collectivization. He claimed that the police 
targeted the wrong people:  
As long as the offensive was directed against the kulaks 
in a united front with the middle peasant, all went well. 
But when certain of our comrades, intoxicated by 
success, began imperceptibly to slip from the path of 
offensive against the kulak to the path of fighting the 
middle peasant; when, in the pursuit of high 
percentages of collectivization, they began to employ 
coercion against the middle peasant, depriving him, of  
the franchise, “dekulakizing” and expropriating him, the 
offensive began to assume distorted form, the united 
front with the middle peasant began to be undermined, 
and, naturally, the kulak received the opportunity to try 
to get on his feet again. (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 175-176) 
 
As far as Stalin was concerned, the policy was sound; only its implementation  
 
was flawed. Nevertheless its consequences were devastating, especially in the 
Ukraine, where the resulting chaos in the countryside led to a famine that 
reportedly killed millions of people (CUF, 1987, passim).  
Now, why did Stalin launch an “offensive” against the kulaks? Here is his 




the countryside in alliance with the middle peasants, for only such an offensive 
can bring us victory” (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 185). Stalin was a Marxist who 
understood social relations in terms of class struggle, not compromise or  
building consensus. For him, to target a class or an ethnic group for punitive 
action was not a capricious act; it was part of a larger historical process. 
Historian Robert Payne writes, “In his struggle for power Stalin showed that he 
would employ any weapon, even the most unscrupulous, in order to achieve his 
aims” (Payne, 1965, 318). Payne is correct. Payne also writes, “Stalin, by 
introducing the cult of the dead Lenin, was reinforcing his own role as the deified 
successor” (Payne, 1965, 345).  Payne again is correct. Stalin saw himself as a 
disciple of Lenin. Indeed he revered Lenin. In a eulogy published in 1924 in 
commemoration of Lenin’s career and contributions to the cause of revolution, 
Stalin said, “Lenin was born for revolution. He was, in truth, the genius of 
revolutionary outbreaks and the greatest master of the art of revolutionary 
leadership” (Stalin, Works, v.6, 63).That Stalin, a Communist, was driven by a 
religious-like fervor is confirmed by biographer Isaiah Deutscher who  
writes, “In his own mind he saw himself not as a modern Pharoah but as a new 
Moses leading the chosen nation in the desert” (Deutscher, 1949, 326-327).   
As Lenin’s disciple, Stalin wanted to achieve victory of the working class, 
and to achieve victory meant acting in accordance with the exhortations of his 
most venerated mentor.  It was Lenin, supreme leader of the revolution, the  
man who successfully led the Bolsheviks to victory, the man most revered by 




meaning to Stalin’s life, who ordered that the kulaks be exterminated. It was not 
Stalin’s idea. In August 1918 Lenin, employing highly inflammatory language, 
wrote: 
The kulaks are the most brutal, callous and savage 
exploiters …. 
 
These bloodsuckers have grown rich on the want 
suffered by the people in the war; they have raked in 
thousands and hundreds of thousands of rubles by 
screwing up the prices of grain and other products. 
These spiders have grown fat at the expense of the  
peasants who have been ruined by the war, at the 
expense of the hungry workers. These leeches sucked 
the blood of the toilers and grew richer as the workers in 
the cities and factories starved. These vampires have 
been gathering and are gathering the landed estates into 
their hands; they keep on enslaving the poor peasants.  
 
Ruthless war must be waged on these kulaks! Death to 
them! Hatred and contempt for the parties which defend 
them – the Right Socialist Revolutionaries, the 
Mensheviks and the present-day Left Social 
Revolutionaries! The workers must crush with an iron 
hand the revolts of the kulaks who are forming an  
alliance with foreign capitalists against the toilers of 
their own country. (Lenin, Selected Works, v.8, 130-131) 
 
Lenin called for aggressive action against the kulaks. His faithful follower, Stalin, 
quoting Lenin verbatim and employing the exact same language would later 
answer the call (Stalin, Leninism, Selected Writings, 191).  According to Lenin, of 
the fifteen million peasant households in Russia, about two million were kulak, 
that is, rich peasants. Thus, going after them would be a big job. Hence, when 
Stalin ordered the collectivization of the farms, it took on aspects of a military  
operation. Historian Robert Conquest writes, “In the early 1930s, the 




battlefield between the Party and the population, and Party solidarity was the 
decisive criterion” (Conquest, 1968, 229). Anyone who opposed the party was 
considered a traitor. It was warfare, class warfare, the proletariat versus the  
bourgeoisie. Whether Stalin had cause to conduct this campaign is debatable; 
whether he deserves to be labeled a monster is debatable too; that he believed 
that he was doing what was right is beyond doubt.  
Perhaps the most notorious example of Stalin’s unbridled use of power 
occurred during the so-called great purge of 1936-1939. In 1934, Serge Kirov, the  
head of the Communist organization in Leningrad and a potential rival to Stalin 
was murdered (Conquest, 1989, 7-9). The exact circumstances surrounding the 
murder were never established. Trotsky believed that Kirov’s death was a political  
assassination and that Stalin was responsible (Conquest, 1989, 71). Nevertheless, 
Stalin used Kirov’s murder as a pretext for launching a purge against “terrorists”  
and “Troskyites” and in effect to “clean house” and further consolidate his power. 
This meant having to “exterminate” the communist opposition (Rogovin, 1998,  
143). Bolsheviks who had opposed Stalin in the past were arrested, tried, 
convicted; the NKVD (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del – the People’s 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs, i.e., Stalin’s security organization) was directed 
to carry out death sentences (Conquest, 1989, 37). At least one million persons 
died as a result of the excesses perpetrated by Stalin and his security police. 
Even the military did not escape. In 1937, Stalin personally accused six major 
political leaders, including Leon Trotsky (who was in exile), and seven senior 




Soviet regime, instigated and financed by the German fascists” and directly 
accused ten of them of being German spies (Rogovin, 1998, 432-433). Trotsky 
condemned the accusations as “absurd” and “shameful,” and the  
subsequent executions of the accused as “murder” (Rogovin, 1998, 445). 
According to Khrushchev, such accusations were trumped up. Many others spent 
ten to fifteen years in prison for nothing (Khrushchev, 1970, 348). 
At times, Stalinist rhetoric devolved into sheer hysteria. During the third 
Moscow show trial against Nikolai Bukharin (“the favorite of the party”) and the  
"bloc of Rightists and Trotskyites," Soviet prosecutor and Stalin mouthpiece 
Andrei Vyshinsky warned that “the Trotskyite hypocrites must be liquidated.”  He 
called the defendants “underground spies,” and “a fifth column, a Ku Klux Klan.”  
Vyshinsky further declared that “the mask of treason has been torn from their 
faces” and that “the masses demand only one thing – to stamp out this accursed  
vermin” (MST, video). These inflammatory words were not mere hyperbole or 
theatrics; they were followed by action. To be accused of treason meant death.  
Estimates of the number of people who died during the great purge vary. 
According to declassified Soviet archives, during 1937 and 1938 the police 
detained 1,548,366 people, of whom 681,692 were shot (Pipes, 2003, 67).   
Robert Conquest believes that the number of persons who died in the camps 
totaled about 3 million (Conquest, 1990, 485).  Historian Michael Ellman claims 
that the number of deaths for those years ranged from 950,000 to 1.2 million 





40,000 persons, 90 percent of whom were confirmed to have been shot (Ellman, 
2007, 676). 
The statistics attest to the brutal nature of the Stalin regime. Yet, before 
deciding whether to close the book on Stalin and conclude that he was a fiend, 
we must first consider certain additional facts. First, Lenin warned that the Soviet  
republic was surrounded by enemies, both external and internal. This was not an 
idea that originated with Stalin. Second, when Lenin issued that warning, in 1918, 
it was not mere hyperbole: the threat was real; the Soviet regime was actually 
under attack, by enemies both domestic and foreign. Stalin was alive at the time. 
Third, as already shown, Lenin had warned of the threat to party unity posed by 
left and right deviationists and Mensheviks. Party factionalism was an idea not 
fabricated by Stalin. Fourth, Lenin ordered that the Soviet Union defend itself  
against spies. The May 31, 1919 edition of Pravda published this directive signed 
by Lenin: “Death to spies! …. All class conscious workers and peasants must  
rise up in defense of the Soviet power and must fight the spies and Whiteguard 
traitors.” (The White Guards were fighters who opposed the Bolsheviks). This  
was Lenin’s directive, not Stalin’s. Fifth, to prevent the party from becoming 
corrupted by petty-bourgeois and petty-bourgeois-anarchist elements, Lenin 
demanded that the party be purged. Lenin also ordered that it “be purged of  
rascals, bureaucrats, dishonest or wavering Communists, and of Mensheviks 
who have repainted their ‘façade’ but who have remained Mensheviks at heart.” 





not originated by Stalin. Sixth, on September 24, 1927, Leon Trotsky made his so-
called Clemenceau statement in which he said that in the event of an emergency  
he would strive to achieve a change in government. Trotsky’s statement 
concluded with these words:  
If I were threatened by an enemy and my eyes were 
blindfolded or my hand tied to my shoulder, I would say 
that the chief danger was – not the enemy, but the 
handicaps restricting my movements. It is a lie that the  
danger or even war itself excludes the self-acting of the 
party, which discusses and decides all questions and 
which directs and checks all its organs from top to 
bottom. If as a result of our mistakes the enemy did  
appear within 80 kilometers of Moscow, then the self-
action of the party would have to be ten times greater 
than under any other conditions. But the task right now 
is not to permit such a situation, but to prevent it. This 
can be realized only by a living party, self-acting and 
completely alive. The first thing that follows from this is 
that there must be a change in the party régime (Trotsky, 
1927, 24-26) 
 
This statement gave Stalin a credible pretext to treat Trotsky and others as 
traitors. These facts in no way mitigate the havoc, hardship and suffering caused  
by the purge, or of Stalin’s responsibility as chief perpetrator, but are presented 
to place Stalin’s actions in an historical context.  
But if Stalin seems cold-blooded, he was operating in a political culture 
which placed no value on mercy. To show mercy was ideologically incorrect. It 
meant giving the enemies of the people a chance, and in class warfare, the  
“final struggle” as Lenin expressed it, that was unthinkable. Lenin framed the 
nature of the struggle in the starkest language: 
Doubt is out of the question. The kulaks are rabid foes 
of the Soviet government. Either the kulaks massacre 







suppress the uprisings of the predatory kulak minority 
of the people against the government of the toilers. 
There can be no middle course. Peace is out of the 
question; even if they quarreled, the kulak can easily  
come to terms with the landlord, the tsar and the priest, 
but with the working class, never. (Lenin, Selected 
Works, 28). 
 
To Lenin, concepts such as liberty and the rights of man were a bourgeois sham, 
ridiculed by Marx himself (Lenin, 1951, 232). Historian Waldemar Gurian writes, 
“As its history and distinctive character prove, the Bolshevik state is an  
absolutist state guided solely by considerations of political expediency, and its 
determination to maintain its authority” (Gurian, 1932, 115). Expediency, not  
morality, driven by historical imperatives was the motivating principle behind 
Bolshevik actions, and Stalin, as a Bolshevik and follower of Lenin, acted 
accordingly. 
Hitler too used coercive measures to settle political differences and 
consolidate his power. There are three instances when he resorted to such a 
tactic. The first was after the Reichstag fire incident. On Feb, 27, 1933 an  
arsonist destroyed the Reichstag. Hitler used this as a pretext to warn Reich 
President Paul von Hindenburg of a Communist takeover.  At Hitler’s request, the  
president signed the so-called Reichstag Fire Decree that suspended civil 
liberties. Armed with this decree, Hitler went after his political enemies. Over  
3,000 persons were arrested, including opposing Communists and Social 
Democrats.  With the left opposition under arrest and in disarray and  
parliamentary government all but destroyed, a truncated Reichstag granted Hitler 




The second episode occurred during an event subsequently known as 
“The Nights of the Long Knives.” Beginning on June 30, 1934, over a two-day 
period SS and Gestapo agents throughout Germany arrested and murdered, on 
Hitler’s order, hundreds of people who Hitler perceived were obstacles to 
achieving absolute power. These opponents included Hitler’s political rival for 
party leadership Gregor Strasser, former Chancellor General Kurt Von Schleicher, 
and Ernst Rohm, commander of the 3-million-man Sturm Abteilung or SA, the 
Nazi Party’s private paramilitary army. The role of the SA was to intimidate and 
crush political opponents. Under pressure to bring the SA under control or lose 
the support of the Army, Hitler decided to eliminate Rohm, who had fought 
alongside Hitler on the streets. The number of murdered in the purge is not 
known, although it is estimated that it may have exceeded one-thousand.  
Regarding Hitler’s role in the assassinations, historian Paul R. Maracin says: “In 
this whole episode we see a mass murderer at work.” (TNLK, video). 
Ten years later, Hitler again resorted to political terror, this time in the 
aftermath of a failed assassination attempt against him by a group of army 
officers who were plotting to stage a coup, known as “Operation Valkyrie” (Fest,  
1975, 709). On July 20, 1944, during one of Hitler’s military conferences, one of 
the conspirators, an army colonel, placed a bomb next to Hitler. The bomb  
exploded, killing four, but Hitler survived with minimal injuries. The plot failed and 
Hitler vowed retribution.  In a speech broadcast to the German nation Hitler 





National Socialists are accustomed” (Shirer, 1960, 1069). Hitler ordered that the 
perpetrators be expelled from the military, denied the right to court-martial, which  
meant no due process, and face the People’s Court. Hitler demanded, “They must 
hang at once without the slightest mercy” (TPKAH, video; Fest, 1975, 711).  
In response to Hitler’s directive, the Gestapo arrested 7,000 persons, 
including the families of the principal conspirators. Pursuant to Hitler’s order, 
those implicated in the plot were put on trial before the People’s Court under the 
jurisdiction of Nazi judge Roland Freisler, who Hitler called “our Vyshinsky” (Fest, 
1975, 711). In the court, the accused were publicly excoriated and humiliated  
before being sentenced to death. They were then executed with great cruelty. 
This reportedly were filmed and shown to Hitler. The numbers believed executed 
vary. Alan Bullock puts the figure at 200 (Bullock, 1971, 844). According to 
William L. Shirer the total was 4,980. Hitler later said that at last he understood  
why Stalin had purged the Red Army years before (Bullock, 1971, 846; Fest, 1994, 
passim).  
Stalin personally ordered mass deportations for reasons of security 
(Ellman, 2002, 676). Stalin believed that “bourgeois influences” used nationalist 
agitation as a cover in order to penetrate state organizations (Stalin, Leninism,  
1942, 168-169). Nationalism, Stalin asserted, constituted a deviation from the 
policy of the Communist Party on the national question, was contrary to the  
teachings of Marx and Lenin, and therefore had to be fought (Stalin, National 





Ethnic groups who had demonstrated anti-socialist tendencies, i.e., 
resistance to Bolshevik rule, and therefore deemed untrustworthy were subjected 
to forced relocation. This program was accelerated during World War II as  
German forces occupied vast areas of the western Soviet Union. It is estimated 
that between 1941 and 1949 nearly 3.3 million persons were deported to Siberia  
and the Central Asian republics (Boobbyer, 2000, 129-130). Ethnic groups 
deported included Poles (in 1939–1941 and 1944–1945), Romanians (1941 and 
1944–1953), Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians (1941 and 1945–1949), Volga 
Germans (1941–1945), Ingrian Finns (1929–1931 and 1935–1939), Finnish people 
in Karelia (1940–1941, 1944), Crimean Tatars, Crimean Greeks (1944), Caucasus  
Greeks (1949-50), Kalmyks, Balkars, Karachays, Meskhetian Turks, Karapapaks, 
Far East Koreans (1937), Chechens and Ingushs (1944) (Pohl, 1999, 9 ff, 139-141). 
The number of deaths resulting from these forced transfers is unknown. One 
estimate puts the figure at 500,000 deaths, another at 43 percent of the total  
number resettled. These population shifts permanently altered the demographic 
landscape of the Soviet Union. Thus by 1989, Latvians comprised only 52 percent  
of their own country; in Estonia the figure was 62 percent. Later, after Stalin’s 
death, Nikita Khrushchev condemned these forced deportations as a violation of  
Leninist principles, but only when de-Stalinization was already in effect 
(Khrushchev, 1970, 596). 
Stalin was neither the first to order mass deportations nor the last.  After 
World War One, Turkey had expelled over 1,000,000 Greeks (de Zayas, 1989, 12). 




government’s intention to “rid” the state of its 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans (de 
Zayas, 1989, 33). In the 1830s the United States had ordered the forced relocation 
of thousands of Native Americans from Georgia and Florida to a region that later  
became Oklahoma (Wilkins, 1986, passim). During World War Two the United 
States ordered the forced internment of thousands of Japanese-Americans  
 (Weiss, 2011, passim). In the aftermath of the war, approximately 15,000,000 
Germans were expelled from Poland and other regions of Eastern Europe  
(de Zayas, 1989, 89). At the Potsdam Conference, the United States and Great 
Britain, albeit with reservations, agreed to these postwar expulsions (de Zayas, 
1989, 88).  Churchill repeatedly approved in principle of this transfer (de Zayas, 
1989, 92).  
Hitler also ordered forced relocations of entire populations, but for different 
reasons.  Whereas Stalin sought to isolate those elements he believed posed a 
threat to the security of the state, Hitler was driven by other concerns: the need  
for more labor to continue the war effort and the need to make good on his vow to 
rid the world of Jews. Estimates of the number of foreign civilian workers brought  
into Germany during the war vary. According to one, 7.6 million foreign civilian 
laborers and POWs were working in the German economy by mid-August 1944.   
According to another, the figure was 10 to 15 million. Only a small fraction of the 
foreign labor force worked voluntarily. Working conditions varied, depending on  
the worker’s country of origin and ethnic background. For those at the bottom of 
the Nazi racial hierarchy – Poles, Russians, and especially Jews – working 




malnutrition, disease and violence; Jews were targeted for extermination 
(Spoerer and Fleischhacker, 2002, 171). 
Concomitant with the forced labor program was Hitler’s main program: the 
plan to exterminate the Jews. Its implementation became known as the Holocaust. 
In every country occupied by Germany, Jews, at the instigation of the German  
occupiers, were rounded up by force and shipped to specially designated 
locations where those deemed unfit to work were systematically murdered, 
mostly by gassing. The transporting of the Jews was coordinated by a 
department in the SS, IV B 4, headed by Adolf Eichmann (Eichmann, 1983, 64 ff). 
Jews not transported were killed near their homes by special police units known 
euphemistically as Einsatzgruppen, a German word meaning “one task units,” the 
intended action being the chasing down, rounding up and killing of Jews 
(Lipstadt, 1993, 9, 55, ff).  
It is estimated that almost 6 million Jews were murdered during the 
Holocaust (Eichmann, 1983, 110; Laqueur, 2001, 145; Schoenberner, 2004, 234). 
The intensity of the suffering inflicted and the scope of the damage incurred are  
incalculable. Throughout German-occupied Europe entire Jewish communities 
were obliterated, and Jewish demographics in Europe permanently altered.  
Jewish houses of worship were defiled and destroyed, Jewish artwork was looted, 
Jewish property was expropriated, and Jews were kicked, beaten, robbed and  
raped. Infants and pregnant women were murdered. Although other groups were 
targeted by Hitler, it was the Jews alone who were earmarked euphemistically for 




word for death (Eichmann, 1993, 108; Lipstadt, 1993, 154-155; van Pelt, 2002, 209, 
217, 331, 332). In 1960 Adolf Eichmann confirmed that the term “Final Solution”  
(Endlosung in German) meant the physical extermination of the Jews (Eichmann, 
1983, 124). 
In the process of comparing Hitler and Stalin, a parallel emerges.  Both men 
employed a specific nemesis, for Hitler it was “the Jew” and for Stalin, “anti-Soviet 
element,” in particular Trotskyism.  The importance of the nemesis as a tool for 
maintaining power cannot be overstated. It provided the dictator with a convenient 
rationale for imposing the harshest repressive measures. The nemesis was used  
as a foil with which to deflect any potential opposition away from the dictator and 
thereby bolster the regime’s credibility. Hence, for Stalin, the label “Trotskyite” 
meant anyone who was threatening to split the party and act as a front for 
counter-revolutionary elements, and for Hitler the term “Jew” meant a foreign  
racial element whose presence was threatening the “natural order” of the world 
(Stalin, Works, v.10, 192-193; Hitler, Table Talks, 237-238). In both cases, to  
maintain the integrity of the regime the threat had to be eliminated, which meant 
taking radical action. 
Although the violence perpetrated by Hitler and Stalin was remarkable in 
terms of its scope and sheer brutality, their actions were not without historical 
precedent. From the eradication of Carthage in 146 B.C. (Bagnall, 2002, 72-75) to  
the destruction of the Aztec Empire in the sixteenth century (Wood, 2000, 15-105), 
there has been some propensity for human beings to perpetrate massive acts of 




commercial, or a combination of all three, and all of which predate Hitler and  
Stalin.   
However, what made Hitler and Stalin unique was the manner by which 
their violence was organized. Terror was converted into an industrial process  
which took rational thinking beings by the millions and transformed them into 
nameless objects to be exploited and discarded. The process occurred in 
concentration camps and gulags, factories where the dehumanization process 
took place, operated by a bureaucracy whose power was absolute and lethal  
(Conquest, The Great Terror, 1990, 264-282). In that respect, both Hitler and Stalin 
can claim full credit both as innovators and enablers. 
Yet, deciding which dictator was worse is an exercise that defies a 
definitive answer. The record of brutality compiled by both regimes alone 
militates against any meaningful attempt to compare the two. Hitler’s rhetoric and  
public posturing was much more emotionally charged, more outlandish, and far 
more hysterical in content than anything Stalin ever said, at least publicly, and so  
on that basis alone Hitler comes off as being more vociferous. No matter how 
egregious the Stalinist excesses, Stalin’s political posturing, compared to Hitler’s,  
is flat. While Soviet rhetoric is crammed with all kinds of vitriolic against the 
perceived enemies of the working class, there is no Soviet equivalent of a Nazi 
policy statement declaring any group as biologically inferior. But such a  
differentiation is dispositive in deciding which program was worse; rhetoric 
notwithstanding, both pursued policies which yielded results that were 




question that cannot be answered with finality or objectivity. The subject is too 
emotionally charged. 
Both Hitler and Stalin pursued policies that led to war, destruction and 
death on an unprecedented scale. However, historian Stephen Wheatcroft asserts  
that “the Stalinist regime may have caused the premature death of more people 
than Hitler’s regime,” but that it did not “purposefully” kill more people 
(Wheatcroft, 1996, 1323). Wheatcroft’s assertion is debatable. Under Stalin people 
were purposefully killed. In the totalitarian environment, it was either cooperation  
or liquidation, there was no middle ground. Thus, those who did not cooperate 
were targeted for punitive action, facilitated by a judicial system in which 
summary executions were legal. The Stalinist purges support that conclusion. 
Although capable of extraordinarily acts of brutality, Hitler’s political 
violence, as differentiated from his racial violence, which was tied into a broader  
policy of genocide, was incremental. Hitler did not have to deal with party 
factionalism; he was the Nazi party. Once opposition was eliminated and his  
power secured, Hitler continued pursuing his other programs. But for Stalin, 
politics and policy were inseparable. Hence, the need for constant vigilance to  
preserve his dominance in a one-party state became an ongoing preoccupation 
which colored the nature of his entire regime. Everywhere and in everything  
Stalin saw “enemies,” “two-facers” and “spies” (Khrushchev, 1970, 585). He 
distrusted his own people; Hitler did not. For Hitler, the German people were his  
racial comrades (Fest, 1975, 710). For Stalin, even group loyalty smacked of 




Stalin believed that radical methods were justified. On that point he did not 
mince words. Everything he did – the deportations, the purges, the show trials –  
was motivated by the need to “break the resistance of the adversaries of that 
class [i.e., the proletariat].” (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 115). Stalin asserted that rule  
of the proletariat was “unrestricted by law” and “based upon force” (Stalinism, 
Leninism, 115). For Stalin, talk of “universal” equality, “pure” democracy, 
“complete” democracy was “bourgeois verbiage” (Stalinism, Leninism, 1942, 115). 
Regarding the purges, Stalin asserted that purging the party was necessary to  
eliminate “the foulness of bureaucracy” and thereby sharpen it and improve its 
effectiveness as the “guiding force” for “all the organizations of the  
working class” (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 90). This required constant vigilance. 
Thus, anyone could be labeled an adversary of the proletariat, bureaucratic  
slacker or a “Trotskyite” and be arrested and executed, which is what happened – 
by the millions – all in the name of an ideology which demanded absolute political  
conformity. By expressing a political opinion that differed from Stalin’s, a person 
could be arrested and summarily executed, purely on ideological grounds.  
Yet these facts alone cannot serve as the basis for drawing comparisons. 
Political scientist Frederic Nicholson writes, “Stalinism was not a new 
phenomenon but rather a reconfirmation of its Bolshevik-Marxist heritage”  
(Nicholson, 1983, 45). Nicholson also describes Stalin as “brutal,” “a diabolical 
power hungry intriguer,” and someone with a “lack of doctrine and pragmatic  
orientation” (Nicholson, 1983, 45, 60, 61). Stalin was brutal. The record supports 




out of control, which suggests the presence of a mental disorder. This is 
speculative. That Stalin was an intriguer is established by the facts. He engaged  
in secret behind-the-scene political maneuvering to gain and keep power. 
Nevertheless, as to his principles and goals, from that he never wavered. Thus,  
Nicholson’s comments provide some basis for forming an opinion as to Stalin’s 
character, but for the most part are inconclusive. 
While Stalin was considered cruel and repressive to some (Khrushchev, 
1970, 566), in Germany Hitler was genuinely loved. Unlike Stalin, who was feared  
by his own entourage and even by ordinary conscripts in the army (Service, 332, 
337, 344), Hitler’s seizure of power threw the majority of Germans “into a 
peculiarly hysterical state compounded of enthusiasm, incredulity and devotion”  
 (Fest, 1975, 374). The German people welcomed Hitler with joy. For the first time 
since the days of the Kaiser, a majority of the German people could identify with  
their government (Fest, 1975, 443). Hitler did not create a national revolution, he 
led a national revolution. Hitler represented many German values (IMAH, video).  
Hitler and the German people resonated with each other. Hitler described 
this relationship as such: “I feel for you and you feel for me.” Germans 
worshipped Hitler as the savior, the redeemer from unbearable poverty and 
suffering (HiC, film – online). Former German Chancellor Franz von Papen talked 
about the “genius of the chancellor [Hitler]” (Fest, 1975, 444). British Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden found Hitler to be controlled and friendly (Fest, 1975, 
443). Hitler was received as a hero and savior in Austria and the Sudetenland 




Europe and elsewhere served in Hitler’s armies (Estes, 2003, passim). The allied 
armies in 1945 were not greeted by throngs of Germans giving thanks for their  
liberation (as many Ukrainians greeted the invading German army) and in the 
period immediately after the war the German people were forced to come to terms  
with the consequences of their “collective guilt” (TFTTR, video). Even after the 
July 20, 1944 assassination attempt, Hitler continued to command wide popular 
devotion (Fest, 1975, 714). 
In contrast to the genuine adoration of German people for Hitler were the 
pleas of the Soviet nationals detained in the West, many of whom had been 
prisoners of war and forced laborers, who desperately resisted repatriation to the 
Soviet Union. Although some had collaborated with the Nazis and thus were  
traitors, most feared return to the Soviet Union because they were members of 
oppressed classes who had been targeted by the regime (Elliot, 1982, 257-258).  
For many of them, return was tantamount to being sentenced to death (Wyman, 
1998, 81).  After the war, the number of Soviet nationals outside of the USSR was  
about five and one-half-million persons (Elliot, 1982, 257). For Hitler, every 
German was part of the Volk; for Stalin every Soviet citizen exposed to Western 
influence was a potential enemy.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
                                                Conclusion 
In conclusion, based on the evidence, one fact emerges: under both Hitler 
and Stalin all legal safeguards meant to protect an individual from the arbitrary 




leaving every person vulnerable to the kinds of abuses associated with state-
sponsored terror. By this measure, the moral turpitude of the Hitler and Stalin 
regimes, when measured against the principles contained in the Bill of Rights, 
can be rated dead even. Whether their victims died in a Nazi concentration camp 
somewhere in Poland or in a Soviet detention center in eastern Siberia, the cause 
of death could be directly attributed to those in power who capriciously set policy, 
issued orders, and demanded results. And it was the results that counted.  
To label Hitler and Stalin as “mental cases” would be glib. Attempts have 
been made to conduct retrospective psychological studies of to detect the 
presence of psychopathology that could account for their behavior. These 
studies are based on information derived without benefit of direct examination of 
the subject. Dr. Norbert Bromberg found that Hitler had a narcissistic personality 
with an underlying borderline personality structure (Bromberg, 1983, 22-23). Dr. G. 
M. Gilbert, the prison psychologist for the defendants at the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg, called Hitler a paranoid psychopath (Gilbert, 1979, 283). 
Clinical Research Coordinator Marina Stal concluded that Stalin had a paranoid 
personality disorder (Stal, 2013, 4). Historian David Reynolds asserts that Stalin 
had a mind that was “savage, vindictive, often paranoid” (SMS, video). As the 
above mentioned claims are offered without any clinical examination of the 
subjects, their conclusions must be treated as highly speculative. There is no 
concrete evidence from any reliable clinical source proving that either Hitler or 





physician, recorded that Hitler exhibited no phobias, obsessions, hallucinations, 
illusions or paranoid trends and that Hitler was neurologically healthy (Morell, 
1983, 35-37). According to historians Roy and Zhores Medvedev, Stalin suffered 
from recurrent muscle pain in his hands and feet; in 1927 he was given a 
thorough physical check-up which otherwise yielded normal results (Medvedev, 
2004, 13).  
That Hitler and Stalin operated according to a set of values that differed 
from mainstream democratic values is a given; that both pursued political 
programs that victimized millions of people is a given too; but to then conclude 
that their actions is evidence of mental illness is clinically unsupportable and  
violates notions of cultural relativism (which holds that there are no universal 
standards to measure cultures (Donnelly, 1984, 400)), and can be construed as an  
abuse of medical science in pursuit of a political agenda, in this case to discredit 
Nazism and Communism. This is not to suggest that retrospective psychological  
studies are not without value; rather, for the reasons already discussed, their 
conclusions cannot be considered as definitive nor can they be used as the basis  
for making comparisons. Ultimately, when comparing Hitler and Stalin, we must 
rely on individual judgment. 
In judging both men, we must take into consideration not only the times 
and cultural influences that shaped them, but also those that shape all of us. We 
all have been subjected to a lifetime of social conditioning that has shaped our 
thoughts. Mass media, such as movies and television (immensely important in 




renders us incapable of considering any question with absolute objectivity. 
Because of biases which are ingrained in our minds, cognitive awareness of bias  
does not dispel bias. For whatever reason, be it political or social, this memory of 
Hitler and Stalin has been, and continues to be, shaped by the dozens of movies  
dealing with them and their respective political systems. Due to all of this: when 
comparing Hitler and Stalin and considering their place in history, the influence  
of bias cannot be avoided. Therefore, the question of who was worse, Hitler or 
Stalin, cannot be studied with full objectivity. The best we can do is to compile 
evidence as fairly and as comprehensively as possible and reduce the influence 
of bias to a minimum. 
With that understanding, what does the evidence say about Hitler and 
Stalin? First, each believed that he was justified in ordering the deaths of others 
as a matter of political necessity. What would seem cruel to many was to them  
not only reasonable but necessary. That was a function of the political culture in 
which they operated. And when setting the rules, they were guided by principles  
they had learned from others. Second, as leaders of totalitarian systems, they 
believed that society was a collective and that the individual was subordinate to 
the good of the group as determined by the leader. To oppose the leader was to 
threaten the cohesion of the group, which in a society that rejected democratic 
values and demanded conformity was itself considered immoral. Third, both 
relied heavily on rationalizations to justify their actions, thereby obscuring the 
inner workings of their minds and hiding what were perhaps their true 




the times also make men. They were the products of history – free choice – yes – 
but also shaped by powerful historical forces. 
The Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 and the collectivization of agriculture in 
the Ukraine, alluded to in this paper, was not examined in more detail because it  
has been sometimes claimed that the horrendous loss of life was due at least in 
part to faulty policy decisions, and not exclusively to repressive measures  
targeting the local population (although the latter did play an important part). 
Millions died as a result of Stalin’s agricultural policy; the exact total is unknown, 
and estimates range from between 4 million to 10 million (Holodomor, online;  
Wheatcroft, 1320, Rummel, 104). Some historians claim these deaths constituted 
genocide (Ellman, 2007).  
Also not examined in more detail was the Nazi program that targeted 
children for murder. That differentiated Hitler from Stalin. Hitler wanted to  
eliminate an entire “race.”  This naturally meant killing children, too. Now, under 
Stalin, the children of those accused of crimes were officially branded relatives of  
enemies of the people.  And that was a heavy burden indeed. Of course, many 
children died during collectivization. Then, and those who enforced 
collectivization knew this would happen, and was happening – and they did 
nothing about it. But Stalin did not deliberately target children for extermination. 
That was a policy unique to the Nazis, who rationalized their actions on racial 
grounds. This doomed the Jews for destruction.  
Jews in Nazi occupied Europe thought that if they were compliant with Nazi 




"Many Jews no doubt felt that they had seen all this before" (Burleigh, 2000, 286). 
This line of thinking seemed logical at the time. They were, after all, living in  
Europe, where, it was believed, barbarism on the scope proposed by Hitler had 
become a thing of the past. This added to the sense of disbelief that their lives  
were actually in danger. Burleigh writes, "Given the difficulties people in liberal 
democracies had in comprehending that one could single out and persecute a  
group of people simply by virtue of membership of that group, it is unsurprising 
that Jewish people could not grasp the enormity of what was happening" 
(Burleigh, 2000, 286). Historian Jost Dulffler writes, "Only a few realized that there 
was no longer any place for Jews in Germany" (Dulffler, 1996, 141). In fact, it soon 
became apparent that there was no longer any place for Jews anywhere in 
Europe, certainly not while Hitler was still in power. 
At first the Jews were stunned. Shocked by the sheer ferocity of the Nazi 
onslaught, there was virtually nothing they could do to defend themselves. 
Isolated, vulnerable, and comprising only a small minority of the total population 
in Europe (In Germany, Jews comprised less than one percent of the population), 
for many Jews, their only defense was to deny what Hitler’s actions implied. To 
admit the truth, that they were doomed, was a prospect too painful to 
contemplate. Some fled, that is, if they were fortunate enough to know someone 
willing to take them in. But for most, they were trapped. Where could they go? 
Powerful nations had succumbed to Hitler’s fury. Other nations remained neutral 





ill-disposed toward Jews, were prepared to follow Hitler’s lead in his campaign to 
make Europe Judenfrei. 
Stalin too was hostile to the Jews, who he believed “posed a mortal danger 
to his regime” (Payne, 1965, 666). However, his hostility was driven by politics,  
not race, which was a fundamental difference between him and Hitler. While it is 
true that some of Stalin’s actions had serious anti-Semitic overtones, such as the 
so-called Doctors’ Plot and his consideration of a plan to purge all the Jews (and  
other ethnic groups as well) from the Soviet Union and transport them to the 
remote northern regions of Siberia where they could die of cold and starvation 
(Payne, 1965, 666-667), there is no evidence that Stalin targeted Jews exclusively 
based on race. That would have meant having to persecute the wives and 
relatives of many of his closest cronies, several of whom were married to Jewish 
women or were related to Jews (Payne, 1965, 666). Not that such familial 
consideration alone would have had a moderating effect on Stalin. But it shows 
that despite his personal disdain for Jews, he allowed his own inner circle to 
associate with them.  
One other point when comparing Hitler and Stalin: Although both dictators 
left a legacy of death and destruction unprecedented in the annals of history, it  
seems that Hitler is regarded with greater hatred. This is the case because 
nobody wants a Third Reich to happen again. The idea of such a nihilistic regime 
re-emerging is simply too outrageous and offensive for most people to accept. 
The same, however, cannot be said for the Soviet Union. Despite the coarseness 




discredited and rejected by most of the world, it still represents for some a noble 
attempt to achieve a just society. Yet, that attempt was driven by a utopian vision  
of the world that was not only a fantasy but was used as the pretext for 
committing some of the vilest crimes in history. When the Bolsheviks executed  
Czar Nicholas II on July 17, 1918, on Lenin’s order, that act could be rationalized 
on political grounds (Pipes, 1994, 9n). But when they also slaughtered his wife 
and five children, that was an act of mass murder motivated by hatred for their  
helpless prisoners (Moorhead, 1984, 284).  After the victims were shot and 
bayoneted, their corpses were mutilated, burned and dumped into the bottom of a 
mine shaft (Lincoln, 1989, 151-155).  This wanton act of butchery established a 
precedent for savagery that both Stalin and Hitler would build upon with lethal 
results. 
It is true that other despots (Mao Tse-tung, Pol Pot and Idi Amin, just to 
name a few) have been implicated in acts of mass murder on a scale or at a rate  
that approximated that of the Nazis and Bolsheviks, but it was Hitler and Stalin 
who set the standard of depravity against which the brutality of other dictators 
have been measured. What made the murderous schemes of Hitler and Stalin all 
the more sinister and chilling is that both believed that what they were doing was  
not only necessary and inevitable but served a positive good. For them, 
obliterating entire peoples or classes was a perfectly valid way, indeed, the only 
valid way, to ensure success of their programs, no matter how grotesque their 





the war does not negate the fact that for two years prior he was Hitler's willing 
ally, and aided and abetted the latter in executing his aggressive designs. By 
providing Hitler cover from the East, Stalin enabled Hitler to invade Poland and 
then concentrate his forces against the West, with devastating results. It was only  
after Hitler betrayed Stalin and unleashed his fury against the Soviet Union that  
the Soviet leader belatedly came to his senses regarding the threat posed by his 
former ally. But by then the damage was done, the Soviet Union was being 
methodically battered, burned, and decimated by hordes of Nazis and their allies,  
all of which forced Stalin to ally himself with the very same countries that he had  
hoped Hitler would destroy. The critical role played by the Soviet Union in 
defeating Hitler is legendary. But for the Soviet Union, victory came at a huge  
price: twenty million people killed. Yet this carnage might have been avoided if 
Stalin had adopted a realistic attitude toward Hitler (Conquest, 1990, 453).  
The wanton deceitfulness shown by Hitler and Stalin toward each other add 
further import to the question of who was worse, Hitler or Stalin. Both have  
records that are so violent as to render any attempt at comparison academic.  
Yet, what both of them did was far from academic – it was real and it happened. 
That both amassed huge numbers of victims is a fact. The numbers speak for 
themselves and require no further elaboration. But more germane is another fact:  
that every victim of Nazi or Soviet persecution was an actual human being, who 
was once alive, had goals, wishes, and desires, and was part of a family and a 
community, and did not deserve to die. Nonetheless their lives were snuffed out 




caused by Hitler or Stalin were not only tragic and criminal but an affront to 
humanity. Whether one was shot by Bolsheviks because he was a kulak or  
gassed by Nazis because he was a Jew, the result was the same. For the victims, 
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